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ABSTRACT
The Civil War was the bloodiest war in American history, and the country felt its impact
in many ways. One of those ways was in the expansion of the pension system. The scale
of the war left thousands of wounded soldiers in need of care, and a government that
recognized its duty to help. In this thesis, I examine the new pension laws that not only
benefitted veterans, but also their dependents. Women and children were included within
the laws of the ever changing and expanding pension system. This system was not just
for white veterans, but also for African-American soldiers who served in the United
States Colored Troops. I will further examine how even though lawmakers in Congress
meant for the system to be colorblind, black veterans and their dependents faced a great
number of additional obstacles when applying for their pensions – obstacles not faced by
white veterans. Even if the veteran could afford to make an application, racism within
the pension bureau and among the government-appointed doctors created an additional
hurdle that could reject a claim, or delay it for months, even years. I conclude that Louis
Benecke represented another kind of obstacle – a lawyer who was entrusted by his clients
to help them, but instead took advantage of them. Benecke’s actions would result in a
series of trials that would lead all the way to the Supreme Court – a court whose limited
reading of the law favored Benecke. These obstacles were detrimental to veterans and
further hindered their ability to create a new life after the war.
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INTRODUCTION

As the Supreme Court began to hear cases during the October term in 1878, Louis
Benecke anxiously awaited his opportunity to defend his reputation before the Court. A
ten count indictment brought against him in Missouri, accusing him of taking money that
belonged to others, tainted his good name and led him into a legal struggle that led to the
highest court in the land. He could not let those accusations stand. After all, he was
considered a hero in his hometown of Brunswick, Missouri, for his service as a Union
officer during the Civil War, had been the town’s mayor, and even served a term as State
Senator. Unfortunately, Benecke had also served as a pension agent after the war who
represented African American veterans and their families – and he took advantage of
these families in order to take their money.
Pension care for the soldiers who served in the American armed forces is not a
modern invention. A system of care for veterans can be traced back to the Revolutionary
period. Yet this system was dramatically affected by the scope and destruction of the
Civil War. Never before had so many Americans fought and never before had there been
the number of wounded veterans that needed aid. In response to this, Congress expanded
the pension system throughout the second half of the nineteenth century to accommodate
the large number of wounded veterans. The new laws covered “veterans with disabilities
(invalid pensions) and the widows of veterans,” as well as “dependent children,
dependent parents (if there was no widow), and other dependents (special
circumstances).”1
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While African American veterans were meant to receive pensions just like white
veterans, black soldiers and their families endured obstacles and hindrances that white
veterans did not have to face nearly as often. Illiteracy, proof of identity, and extra
financial burdens were some of the initial obstacles faced by black veterans, but they also
had to contend with a deep level of racism that existed within the Pension Bureau from
both agents and doctors alike.
Yet there is one further type of obstacle that most historians do not focus on – the
lawyers and pension agents who were supposed to help. These were men who looked to
take advantage of the people they were meant to help so that they could “exploit the
system for their own profit.”2 Men like Louis Benecke.
This paper looks at the pension system as it developed over the years and how the
Civil War affected the need for its expansion. The changes examined within the system
look at how these changes related to the Army only and do not focus on the Navy. It
examines what the system meant to cover, how it changed, why, and how that system put
extra barriers in the way of African American veterans. Finally, this paper examines the
case of Louis Benecke in order to reveal one example of the lengths one man went to in
order to take advantage of black veterans.

2
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THE GROWTH OF VETERAN CARE

Among the numerous innovations and changes that came about as a result of the
Civil War, the expansion of a national pension system to care for wounded soldiers is not
one that most think about when considering the cost of the war. The scale of devastation
and death caught the nation unprepared and the need “to care for him who shall have
borne the battle” was quickly recognized in Washington.3 Yet taking measures to give
aid to wounded veterans did not originate during the Civil War. While the magnitude and
scope of the war caused the Federal government to expand pension care for veterans to
new heights, a system of veteran care already existed within the country.
Ever since the days of the Revolutionary War, government distribution of
pensions for wounded soldiers and their dependents became a heated topic. At that time,
the Continental Congress considered setting up a disability pension “for wounded
soldiers and lifetime service pensions (at half-pay) for officers.”4 This was contingent on
whether the soldier received his debilitating wound, or died, as a direct result of fighting
in the war. This debate resulted in the passing of the first Federal Pension Law on
August 26, 1776.5 According to the law, aid would be given until the wounded man
recovered from his injuries. One can see that law was meant to be temporary. A
wounded soldier deserved to be cared for as long as he could not work for himself. As
soon as he was able, the soldier would resume taking care of himself and no longer need
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aid from the government. If the man never fully recovered, then the man would receive a
pension for life.
However, the idea of the national government creating a pension system for
former soldiers received a good deal of opposition. Opponents argued that the ideals and
principles of the new Republic did not allow for a pension system or any other form of
“federal charity.”6 This opposition faded in the wake of the War of 1812, however, when
public sentiment felt a resurgence of national pride. To abandon those brave soldiers
who risked their lives fighting for American liberty to a life of suffering and poverty
became unacceptable. How would it appear to outside observers if the American
government did not look after its own heroes? Would that not diminish us in some way?
The public sentiment after the War of 1812 was that it certainly would. Many felt the
nation owed these men a debt.7
As a result of this public outcry, Congress passed the Revolutionary War Pension
Act in 1818. Under this act, privates received $96 a year and officers who served at least
nine months received $240 a year. Soldiers were required to swear that they were “in
reduced circumstances” and “in need of assistance from [their] government for support.”8
Public support for this act was high – mostly because of assurances that the pension
program would not last long, nor would it cost a great deal. It was believed that fewer
than 2000 former soldiers were eligible for pensions, with a projected first year cost of
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$115,000.9 This would be among the first of many times the government underestimated
the eligibility and cost of caring for soldiers.
As a result of the act, thousands of former soldiers applied for a pension. So
many came forward that in 1820 Congress added a means test to the application process.
All new applicants, as well as veterans already on the rolls, had to list their place of
residence, what their occupation was and their income, their personal health, any and all
debts, and an inventory of all personal property. This was then submitted to the War
Department along with the age, health, gender, and personal relationship with each
member of the soldier’s household. Further, all applicants were required to obtain a
codicil – a document that entailed the assessment of a court as to the value of a soldiers
property.10
One final provision created by the War Department was the establishment of a
poverty line. While this line was un-official – simply an additional mechanism for the
War Department to determine who should or should not get a pension – only those
applicants whose income fell below this line would be considered worthy of a pension.
Despite the creation of these additional provisions, however, over 18,000 of the 20,000
soldiers who applied still qualified for a pension.11
The Revolutionary War Act of 1818 laid the groundwork for the additional acts
that would follow throughout the nineteenth century.12 It was the first federal assistance
program instituted on a wide basis to address the needs of veterans and poverty. By
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establishing a pension for veterans of the Revolutionary War, the government gave back
the ability to live a productive life for many of its poorest and most deserving citizens.
Over the next two decades Congress expanded the provisions for pension
coverage which, coincidentally, grew as more white males were given the right to vote.
Then, in 1832, Congress authorized service pensions for all living veterans. This affected
over 33,000 former soldiers whose average age by this time was 74.5 years.13 The
broadening of the pension system for aging veterans would be something Congress would
revisit toward the end of the century. Four years later, the parameters of the pension
system were broadened again so that the widows of Revolutionary War soldiers began
receiving pensions as well.
As the number of veterans receiving pensions increased over the first few decades
of the nineteenth century, Congress decided to create a separate bureau under the War
Department, the Pension Bureau, and appointed a Commissioner to it in 1833. The
Pension Bureau remained under the supervision of the War Department until 1849, when
the Department of the Interior was created. By the time of the Civil War, the number of
people on the pension rolls totaled roughly 10,700 – this included widows as well as
soldiers – and the cost for providing pensions for the “fiscal year ending June 30, 1861,
was $1,072,000.”14 The largest number of these were veterans of the Mexican War and
the number of those receiving a pension declined “at the rate of five or six hundred each
year.”15
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For the Pension Bureau, any of the wars fought before the Civil War were
classified as “old wars.”16 While the pension system itself underwent a number of
changes from the first law in 1776, these were small compared to what was to come
because of the outbreak of the Civil War. The immense scale and numbers involved with
running the war greatly impacted the way veterans would be cared for in the years
following the war. It also created opportunities for corruption, bigotry and prejudice that
hindered the ability of some veterans, namely soldiers who fought in the United States
Colored Troops (USCT), from gaining the benefits they deserved.

16
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THE GENERAL-LAW SYSTEM

As a result of the Civil War, the American Pension system for veterans and their
dependents received a remarkable degree of change over the next few decades. The first
substantial change took place between 1862 and 1890, and is often referred to as the
General-Law System. An examination of this time period reveals the dilemma faced by
the federal government in dealing with the scale of wounded veterans and their
dependents, while at the same time recognizing a sense of duty and responsibility towards
the care of veterans for the sacrifices made by these men.
Despite the patriotic fervor generated throughout the North and the South from
the opening of hostilities in April 1861, the country was not prepared for the large
numbers of men needed to fill the ranks of both armies. Never before had Americans
gone to war on such a scale as they did during the Civil War. Men left their families by
the hundreds of thousands and a great number of them never returned home.
Initially, volunteers overflowed recruitment offices – volunteers who thought that
the war would be brief and did not want to miss the action. By the fall of 1862, however,
all notions of a short war vanished and the reality of a long, bloody conflict became
apparent. As casualty rates went up, public support for the war went down, as the
hardship felt by the wives and children left behind at losing their main source of financial
support grew day by day.
Care for those left behind was initially done at the state and local level. In towns
and communities across the country, a combination of different types of public and
private assistance to the families of men who volunteered provided some relief to the

8

strain of losing their primary providers.17 This kind of community recognition and aid
made it possible for men to more willingly join the army. After all, the pay for an
enlisted man only amounted to eleven dollars a month for a private. A soldier could not
support a family on this alone. Through these kinds of efforts at the state and local
levels, one can see that families and communities understood the importance of taking
care of not only the soldiers, but their families as well. As historian Megan McClintock
put it, “State, local, and individual efforts to diminish the destructive impact of war and
disunion on families went hand in hand with preparations to preserve the nation by
military means.”18
The public and private interests behind local aid designed these measures as a
temporary system of aid – something to provide help for a short time during a short war
with few casualties. These systems were not meant to extend over a period of years.19
Then in the spring of 1862, in the wake of the carnage of Shiloh in the west and the
Peninsula Campaign in the east, many in the North began to rethink their support of the
war. The war became a much bigger, as well as longer, endeavor and men were no
longer eager to enlist in a prolonged affair that kept them from home for an extended
period. Needing additional troops for longer periods of time forced the government to
adopt, what John William Oliver called, a “policy of persuasion.”20
One of the main ways established to entice men to enlist came through the offer
of a “bounty,” or bonus. Any man willing to enlist in the Union army would receive a
$100 bounty from the government after his enlistment was over – a substantial amount of
17
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money for most during this time. In the summer of 1862, recognizing the strain at home
created by an extended war, the War Department authorized each new recruit to receive
$25 of the $100 promised up front.21 This was so each man could provide at least some
aid for his family at the time of enlistment instead of having to wait for several years.
The remainder of the bounty was to be paid to the soldier when his enlistment was over –
provided that he received an honorable discharge.
Regardless of government efforts to encourage enlistment, the prospect of being
away from their families, and leaving them without means, kept many men away from
the army. In addition, there was a serious flaw in the state and local aid efforts
established to help soldiers’ families: once a soldier was either dead or discharged, their
families no longer received help. Aid was based on having a loved one fighting in the
army. If a soldier was killed, his family would not receive any more aid. Likewise, if a
soldier was alive, but seriously wounded, his family received no more aid.22
This last instance might not seem like much of a problem – after all, if you are
still alive could you not simply go home? The problem with this is that many men with
serious injuries had to spend long periods in army hospitals recovering from their
wounds. Even though their service might be over, they could still not go home right
away. What would their families do in the meantime? The idea that their wives and
children would be left to fend for themselves was an idea that kept many men from
wanting to enlist in the army.
The realization of having to engage in a prolonged war, as well as the evergrowing casualty lists, made the issue of aid for both soldiers and their families a major

21
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concern for the Republican controlled Congress in the summer of 1862. Some, such as
the Commissioner of Pensions, Joseph H. Barrett, recognized the need to reform the
pension system with the wives, widows, and children of soldiers in mind. Barrett
received support from Attorney General Edward Bates, who noted in March of 1862 that
the “pension provisions for widows and orphans were insufficient or nonexistent.”23 It
was not acceptable to support veterans while at the same time neglecting the families of
those veterans.
The growing sentiment for change regarding care for soldiers and their
dependents led an enthusiastic Republican-controlled Congress to pass a new pension act
on July 14, 1862. According to this new law, pension benefits would be granted to
veterans whose service left them with disabilities “incurred as a direct consequence
of…military duty,” or “from causes which can be directly traced to injuries received or
disease contracted while in military service.”24 This new pension system followed strict
guidelines about what was considered a “total disability,” which under the new law meant
an “inability to perform manual labor.”25 It applied to “all military service subsequent to
March 4, 1861” and to all future wars in which the United States might be involved.26
This lasted until World War I, when Congress changed the pension requirements.
According to the 1862 law, rank determined how much money a veteran received
each month, despite concern within Congress that to give more money to those of higher
rank would be unfair. Any soldier ranked lieutenant colonel or higher received $30 every
month, while a private received just eight dollars a month for the same level of disability.

23
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Ever increasing debate over disability coverage prompted Congress to change the law
two years later by making fixed rates for the various types of disabilities incurred by
soldiers. In addition, the pension system awarded special benefits for “severe mishaps or
for disabled veterans who required special attendants.”27 It became important to
recognize the injuries of each soldier, both big and small, and provide compensation.
For example, if a soldier lost both of his hands in battle, he would be eligible to
receive $25 a month. This was also the rate for a soldier who lost both eyes in combat,
(although the loss of both eyes could provide as high as $72 a month depending on a
soldiers rank – the loss of both feet would get the same amount also).28 This amount
doubled over the next ten years. The highest rate that a soldier could receive for the loss
of both hands was $100, although the number of people who received this rate was low.
In the years that followed the war, distinct categories of disabilities broadened
further. For instance, claiming a disability for the loss of an arm had different grades. If
a veteran lost an arm at the shoulder joint then that soldier received $18 a month. If the
loss occurred at the elbow joint, however, then the soldier received only $15 a month.
These fixed rates for various disabilities were not just affected by Congress. The
Commissioner of Pensions, by the authority of additional laws enacted in 1873 and 1888,
fixed rates himself for nearly fifty additional disabilities.29 If the total amount a soldier
was to receive did not go over $17, then any minor disabilities the soldier might have
could be added in to his pension amount.
For example, if the soldier lost his big toe, he would receive $6 a month; likewise,
if the soldier was rendered deaf in one ear, he would receive $6 as well. The loss of a
27
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finger or a toe (not counting the big toe) received $2 a month.30 Going by these amounts,
a soldier who lost his big and little toe, a little finger, and was made deaf in one ear
would receive a monthly pension of $16. In addition, the act of March 2, 1895 put a $6
minimum on disabilities.31 This means that a soldier who lost a little toe or a little finger,
which carried a rate of $2, received no less than six dollars a month.
According to a report issued from the Commissioner of Pensions, the number of
soldiers receiving the $6 rate was more than any other rate – the second highest rate
received was twelve dollars followed by those who received $8.32 This reveals that, while
there were many who received a full disability check each month, there were a great
number of veterans who received only a partial pension for their injuries.
While the Pension Act of 1862 began the expansion and improvement of benefits
for soldiers, its greatest impact came in what it did for dependents. The act of 1862
specifically included widows, orphans, and even mothers of troops. The amount widows
received was still based on their husbands’ rank, and would be awarded to her after his
death – provided that the death resulted from injuries or disease brought about by the war.
A widow received her husband’s pension for as long as she was a widow.33 This
was a crucial part of the 1862 law because as soon as a widow remarried she lost her
husband’s pension. The only way for her to get it back was if she was to once again
become a widow, or divorced, or be left without means. Of course, she had to provide
proof of her lack of means and demonstrate that her annual income did not exceed $250 a
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year.34 Extra restrictions such as these may have been in place to discourage widows
from making future attempts to regain a pension.
Having to constantly prove one was a widow created interesting wrinkles in how
the pension of a widow was monitored. Pension Bureau agents soon learned that it was
not easy to verify a widow’s marriage or that she remained a widow. After all, since
remarriage meant the loss of a pension, widows had an incentive to hide a new marriage
from the government. This fear of possible fraud led the Pension Bureau to enact some
invasive requirements on widows.35
First, a widow must show proof of a valid marriage and she had different ways in
which to do this. She could provide something in the public record that recorded the
marriage took place or she could get an affidavit from the minister who performed the
ceremony. A widow could also provide testimony from two or more witnesses who
attended the wedding or, if available, she could provide a record of baptism of her
children – though bureau agents tended to give more credibility to documents than to the
testimony of witnesses.36 The inability to provide such proof – due to loss of public
records or inability to find witnesses – would result in the rejection of a claim until such
proof could be collected.
Once a widow established a valid marriage, however, she was not done. Since
bureau agents suspected widows of trying to conceal illicit affairs or remarriage, they
“added moral supervision to its regulatory and investigative capacities.”37 This began in
1866 with the passing of a bill that directly targeted widows and monitored their activities
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in order to prevent them from doing anything improper – such as defrauding the
government. Fraud was thought to be so pervasive that in 1868 Commissioner of
Pensions Christopher C. Cox asked Congress for “discretionary power” over the claims
of widows in order to oversee what he called “flagrant violations of morality.”38
Cox believed that the number of widows who attempted to hide illicit affairs grew
constantly, even to the point where he declared that some lived “openly in prostitution.”39
Whether or not Cox was correct about his assumptions regarding the character of
widows, his remarks do indicate a serious mistrust of widows who received a pension.
The attempt by Cox to gain control over the monitoring of a widow’s private life
did not receive sufficient support during the 1860’s and 1870’s. Congress did not feel it
was the place of government, nor was it the place of Pension Commissioners, to police
the morality of American citizens. When a bill to terminate pensions for widows guilty
of cohabitation (living with someone with whom you are not married, but receiving a
pension) was defeated in 1869, it was due to this over-extension by men like Cox.40
Judging whether or not a widow was virtuous enough was not an authority
Congress was willing to give to a Pension Commissioner – at least, not then. It would
take thirteen more years, but, in 1882, Congress did pass a law that canceled the pensions
for widows guilty of cohabitation.41
While intensive scrutiny was placed on the widows of veterans, the need to care
for the children of veterans received attention as well in the decades after the war. Any
dependent children under the widow’s care, at first, did not receive any additional aid.
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They were simply under the care of a widow who received her husband’s pension. This
changed, however, in 1866 when Congress decided to pay an extra $2 for each child of
the deceased soldier under the age of sixteen.42 This was a crucial and much needed
addition for many widows who had larger families. The base pension for a private was
$8 – not enough to provide for a widow with multiple children to feed.
What became of children who lost their father, yet had no mother to look out for
them? The act of 1862 provided for them as well. A legitimate orphan, under the age of
sixteen, received the same pension amount that a widow received.43 If, for whatever
reason a widow lost her right to the pension of her husband – through remarriage for
instance – the Pension Bureau turned the pension over to the children. This only lasted,
however, until the child turned sixteen. An exception could be made if the child was
incapable of self-support. For instance, if the child was determined to be mentally
deficient, or declared insane and in need of institutional help. If this was established,
children were eligible to receive their fathers pension for life, or until their disability was
healed.
Yet, what if a Civil War soldier died and left no wife or children behind? Here is
where the 1862 law changed the system in a great way: should a soldier have no wife or
children, then the pension could go to the soldier’s dependent mother. This was a major
addition to the pension system. As Megan McClintock points out, “This law made
mothers and sisters of deceased servicemen eligible for federal pensions for the first
time…and paved the way for an 1866 amendment that extended pensions to fathers and
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brothers.”44 These rates were, again, based on the rank of the soldier, but now the reach
of the pension system extended beyond the nuclear family into a much broader scope that
included the extended family.
This was not always an easy task, however. In order for a mother or father to
receive a pension on account of the death of a son, the parents must provide proof that
their son provided them with assistance and that they had to have this assistance in order
to live. Proof could be accomplished in several ways. For instance, if the parent had a
letter from their son in which he stated that he was sending money home to help them,
this could be offered as proof of dependence. Likewise, if the parent obtained testimony
from their son’s previous employer about how much the son made and the way he gave
money to his parents, this, too, could be offered as proof.45 A parent who provided this
type of proof to the Pension Bureau did not have much trouble applying for a pension.
What if the parent was dependent of their son and was not able to provide proof?
Was the parent of a veteran to be left out? This was certainly a concern in the first
decade after the war – big enough that in 1872, Pension Commissioner J.H. Baker
submitted a report to Congress in which he warned that many aging parents, with
“increasing infirmities,” would have their claims rejected and would therefore be left
without help.46 He convinced Congress that a change was necessary and that it needed to
expand the definition of dependency.
As a result of Baker’s report, in 1873, Congress passed a new law that stated “that
parents were entitled to federal assistance ‘if by actual contributions or in any other way’
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their deceased son had aided in their support.”47 This was quite a broadening of the
definition of dependency. From this law, a parent no longer needed to provide solid
proof that their son provided support by way of testimony or letters that stated he sent
money home. Now all a parent had to do was show that the son had intended to help in
order to become eligible to receive a pension.
In her article, “Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of Union Families,”
Megan J. McClintock provides an example of this through the story of Mary Harth,
whose son, Henry, was a Civil War soldier who died in 1864. Mary had no proof that she
could offer that demonstrated that she was dependent on her son for assistance. In fact,
Henry had only sent money to his mother one time during the two years prior to his
death. What Mary did have, however, were letters from Henry in which he stated his
intention to help her. With evidence of his intentions, along with evidence of her own
difficult financial situation, Mary claimed that the death of her son deprived her of the aid
that “she would have a natural right to expect to receive from him.”48 In other words,
since Henry would have helped her had he lived, she deserved his pension – a pension
she was granted in 1884.
Despite the expanded definition to the law of 1873, difficulties still existed within
the application process for parents and the process itself could often be rather lengthy due
to the larger number of applicants after the war. One reason for this is that the longer a
parent waited to apply for a pension – some waited years after the death of a son to apply
– the more difficult it was to provide the evidence needed to be accepted.49 Another
reason is that the Pension Bureau viewed the chain of support for a woman as first
47

McClintock, “Civil War Pensions,” 468. Emphasis added.
McClintock, “Civil War Pensions,” 469.
49
McClintock, “Civil War Pensions,” 469.
48

18

through her husband and then through her son. The husband was always seen as the
primary bread winner. Therefore, if a mother of a veteran applied for a pension, the
Pension Bureau wanted to fully investigate the status of the husband – his health and
finances – in order to determine why the mother was dependent on her son. This could
extend the application process by years.
Another difficulty rested in the fact that the burden of proof was different for a
father claiming dependence on his son than for the mother. A dependent father was one
who could not provide for his family as he was supposed to. McClintock provides an
example of this as well through the claim of James Lumsden. Lumsden applied for a
pension in 1875 and claimed that at the time his son Calvin died he was dependent on
him because he could not support his family. Lumsden, however, could not provide
sufficient evidence for this and the Pension Bureau rejected his claim. It took Lumsden
several years to acquire enough evidence – documents that showed outstanding debt,
inability to pay mortgage on his home, and poor health – to demonstrate his claim that he
could not adequately support his family of thirteen children.50
One can see from the examples above that even though the Pension Act of 1862
expanded the pension system in new ways, getting one’s claim approved by bureau
agents was not a given. The many requirements enacted by the bureau and its officials,
while trying to accurately verify legitimate claims, often kept many from receiving the
benefits due them – even when the claims were real. While the government felt a sense
of duty to take care of those brave soldiers who served their country, and their families,
as the years passed from 1862 to 1875, the government also fostered a sense of distrust
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about many of the same people they were trying to provide help for. Despite this, the act
of 1862 laid the groundwork for every pension act to follow throughout the remainder of
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.

20

THE ARREARS ACT

Given the brutal nature and scope of the Civil War, as well as the addition of a
new pension law like the one passed in 1862, the number of wounded soldiers and their
families applying for pensions grew tremendously compared to before the war. A key
figure demonstrates the magnitude of this growth. Before 1862, the number of veterans
and their dependents receiving a pension from the federal government was 10,700, which
cost the government just over $1,000,000 a year.51 While thought to be high, this number
declined each year as aged veterans from previous wars died. However, by 1866 the
number of claimants on the pension rolls numbered 126,722 and the amount paid each
year jumped to $15.5 million.52 These costs were staggering each year to a country
reeling economically from four years of war and the costs of expanding the pension
system grew each year throughout the remainder of the 1860’s.
Although staggering, the growth of pensions did not appear to be long lasting.
While the initial wave of applicants greatly expanded the roles, by 1873 the number of
applicants declined to the point that the roles no longer grew. By the following year the
annual cost for providing pensions seemed to hit its peak. In her article, “America’s First
Social Security System: The Expansion of Benefits for Civil War Veterans,” historian
Theda Skocpol gives several reasons for the slowdown of applicants in the mid-1870’s.
Among these are a “desire to forget the war” and begin their post-war lives, “an absence
of financial need,” and “a reluctance on the part of some to take handouts from the
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government.”53 Skocpol also suggests that a primary reason for the decline in
applications was that “the subjectively most pressing needs of the veterans…had already
been addressed.”54 This is a curious conclusion given the growing number of changes to
the pension system that were still to come in the decades following the mid-1870’s.
Perhaps the most compelling indication for the reduction in veteran applications
for pensions Skocpol gives for this period has to do with the application process itself.
Many soldiers did not know about the possibility of receiving a pension, nor were they
knowledgeable about how to go about applying for it. Each soldier needed to fill out the
proper paperwork and provide proof of their claims. They then needed to travel (at their
own expense) to the nearest government authorized doctor to be examined. This was to
verify that the injuries suffered by the veteran were due to the war. If the application was
too confusing a veteran might seek assistance from a lawyer, but this would add to the
cost as well.
Even after a veteran completed his application process, saw a doctor, and
provided all the proof required by the government, there was still a good chance that the
Pension Bureau would reject the claim. Between 1862 and 1875, “the Pension Bureau
refused to accept about 28 percent of the applications it received.”55 Twenty-eight percent
is a large percentage of veterans who were unable to receive the pension due them and
perhaps the biggest reason applicants chose not to apply for a pension at all. If better
than one out of every four veterans who went through the long application process were
rejected, this might have discouraged many from wanting to undertake the process
themselves – which is why the percentage of veterans who applied in the decade after the
53
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war was so low. By 1875, only 6.5 percent of eligible veterans chose to apply for a
pension.56
Despite the trend of lower numbers of applicants during the 1870’s, legislation at
the end of the decade turned the declining numbers around and started the number of
applicants climbing again. The Pension Act of 1879: Arrears Law was passed by
Congress on January 16, 1879, and signed into law by President Rutherford B. Hayes on
January 25, 1879.57 The law basically states that veterans of the Civil War who filed
pension claims after the war were eligible to have their cases reopened in order to receive
pay due them from the time of their leaving the army.
For instance, if a wounded soldier serving in the Union army was discharged in
1864 and filed a claim for a pension in 1869, then that soldier would receive back
pension pay dating back to the date of his discharge from the army – five years’ worth.
This back pension pay was issued to the soldier in one lump sum, or “Arrear.” If a
dependent made the claim for a pension – widow, mother, etc. – then the pay would go
back to the date of death of the soldier.
This act did not just affect veterans and families who already filed claims with the
Pension Bureau, but it applied to all new applications submitted from 1879 on. If a
soldier filed a claim in 1879, and was discharged from the army in 1865, that soldier not
only received a regular pension, but they also received a lump pension payment for
money they would have received for the past fourteen years. This was a monumental
piece of legislation that impacted the country in two key ways.58
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First, it dramatically increased the number of applicants who filed claims with the
Pension Bureau. The average number of veterans who applied each month, before 1879,
was roughly 1600 people a month. After the passing of the Arrear law, however, that
number jumped to over 10,000 people a month.59 Those who may have been dissuaded
from the application process for whatever reason now had a rather large incentive to
make a claim. The lump sum payments could turn the financial situation of veterans and
their dependents from one of hardship and struggle to one of optimism and comfort.
By the early 1880’s, the average arrear payment to a wounded veteran was
$953.62, while the average payment for dependents (widows, mothers, children, etc.) was
$1,021.51.60 In today’s money, that would roughly be a lump payment between $42,000
and $43,000 for a soldier, and between $45,000 and $46,000 for a dependent.61
One can begin to understand the importance of receiving a lump payment like
these. It is even more striking when one considers, as Theda Skocpol pointed out, that
“the average annual money earnings of nonfarm employees totaled about $400,” which
made payments such as these a cornerstone on which a struggling veteran or his
dependents could build a better life.62 A veteran or his dependents could afford a home,
pay off outstanding debts, and better provide for their children in order to ensure they
have a better future.
In order to aid veterans or their dependents further when applying to the Pension
Bureau, the Arrear Law struck out a previous provision that reduced testimonial evidence
59
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as secondary to documented evidence. This was another advantage for applying veterans.
Before, when showing evidence of service and that a soldiers’ injuries were war related, a
soldier could provide testimony from those with whom he served, or from others he
knew, who could vouch for the truth of the claim. This kind of evidence was viewed as
less credible than actual documentation from the War Department. With the passing of
the Arrear Law, testimonial evidence could be given more weight, making it easier for an
applicant to receive approval for a pension.63
Unfortunately, the desire to help wounded veterans and their dependents did not
come about simply from patriotic notions of helping America’s wounded heroes. Even
though the passage of the Arrears Law swept through both houses of Congress and
received a great deal of bi-partisan support, both parties also saw potential in using the
growing sentiment for veteran support as a political tool. Both sides wanted to appear as
the champions of wounded soldiers and their families and, in the wake of the passing of
the Arrear Law, both parties wanted to take credit for it.64
By 1875, Reconstruction was slowly drawing to a close and the Democratic Party
regained control of many of the southern states. Its ability to gain support in the north,
however, was a difficult undertaking. Democratic politicians began to see the expansion
of the pension system as a means to prove their patriotism to people in the north, as well
as undermine Republican attempts to use the “bloody shirt” rhetoric to keep Democrats
on the defensive. Both sides looked to court voters by appearing to be the most energetic
on the topic of veteran care – this might have something to do with the fact that while the
Senate debated the Arrear Law, “twenty-five senators faced reelection in their state
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legislatures.”65 It became clear to politicians in both parties that support for veterans
through expanding their pensions could be a useful political tool to gain influence during
election cycles.
One of the main ways politicians used pension legislature to their benefit was
based on the fact that Congress had some control on when and where pension benefits
were distributed. Even though the bills passed on the pension system laid out guidelines
that were to be used by bureau agents to determine the validity of claims, by 1879 the
system had been amended so many times that it developed room for a good deal of
personal interpretation by officials. With the passing of the Arrear Law, tens of
thousands of applicants came forward to apply and tens of thousands more previous cases
came under review in order to determine back pension pay. This created a backlog of
applicants that opened the door “for the manipulation of the timing of case processing.”66
By carefully playing the needs of their constituents, politicians on both sides could craft
support from veterans by focusing aid to areas that made a difference in upcoming
elections.
Essentially, congressmen became a type of lobbyist for veterans. For instance, if
a soldier felt that his application did not receive adequate attention, or took longer than it
should, that soldier would write to his congressman for assistance with his claim.
Michigan Representative Roswell G. Horr, remarking in 1882 of the assistance requests
of former soldiers, said, “I think it is safe to say that each member of this House receives
fifty letters each week; many receive more…One-quarter of them, perhaps, will be from
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soldiers asking aid in their pension cases.”67 Congressmen spent a good deal of time
contacting the Pension Bureau in order to check on the status of claims for the veterans
who wrote them.
In a very short time, the Pension Bureau became flooded with requests from
politicians wanting to know what was going on with this claim or that. Consider these
numbers: “In 1880 it was reported as amounting to nearly 40,000 written and personal
inquiries; in 1888 it had more than doubled (94,000 items); and in 1891 it reached a peak
of 154,817 congressional calls for information of the condition of cases, an average of
over 500 for each working day.”68 In this way, congressmen put a great amount of
pressure on the Pension Bureau to provide answers for all these numerous daily requests
– thus they became, whether intentional or not, a lobbying group for veterans in order to
court their favor.
Whenever possible, bureau agents were encouraged by politicians to give claims
the benefit of the doubt or to move them along as quickly as possible. This did not
always mean that the Pension Bureau would approve the claims that politicians wanted
them to. When this occurred, “private pension bills” were used to get certain claimants
on the rolls, or to increase the benefits for those already receiving a pension.69 It should
be noted that even though these “private pension bills” did exist, they did not make up a
large number of new applicants, nor did they effect a great number of those already on
the rolls. This did not, however, stop congressmen from spending a great amount of
effort to get them passed. In just the 49th Congress alone – serving from 1885 to 1887 –
“40 percent of the legislation in the House and 55 percent in the Senate consisted of
67
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special pension acts.”70 Even if the total number of claims aided by the help of
congressmen was not a high percentage, just the fact that politicians from both parties
spent so much time aiding veterans reveals how important it was to them – both because
they wanted to be their champions, and because both parties wanted to use them to gain
majority control over Congress.
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, private bills became the
standard operating procedure within Congress. With the emergence of veterans groups
who worked to help potential veterans apply, as well as to work for better and broader
benefits for soldiers and their families, it is not surprising that both Democrats and
Republicans recognized the potential benefit of cultivating support from a growing block
within America. And the lengths to which some politicians went to curry favor seem
rather bold. Theda Skocpol, one of the leading researchers on Civil War pensions and the
pension system overall, claims that some bills by congressmen “actually changed the
military records of former soldiers classified as deserters in order to make them eligible
for pensions.”71 One can see in this the pervasiveness of the impact the issue of veteran
care became, both in the everyday life of veterans and politicians.
However, with the rapidly rising cost of funding pensions, which resulted
following the passing of the Arrears Law, Democrats and Republicans began a split on
the issue of support for Civil War pensions. While Republicans represented themselves
as the party who oversaw the preservation of the nation, Democrats were concerned with
the tremendous cost of funding the pension system. They wanted to lower tariffs and
check the rising spending on pensions, as well as examine cases of fraud that existed with
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some claims. The Republicans, by contrast, wanted to keep the tariffs – especially the
extra money they generated that could then be used to expand federal programs, such as
the Pension Bureau.
The plan to cultivate pension recipients as a solid voting block (a block comprised
of “an electorate in which more than 10 percent of the potential voters were Union
veterans”) was a success for the Republicans.72 By pushing for continued tariffs and
expanded benefits for veterans and their dependents, Republicans gained significant
support among northern and western states, and helped secure the White House in 1888.
It led them to a majority in both houses of Congress that year.
By 1890 the pension system in America grew to unprecedented heights. Never
before had so many veterans received assistance from the government. By 1890, Civil
War pensions became, what Megan McClintock calls, “a social welfare system of vast
dimensions.”73 Tens of thousands of former soldiers, as well as their dependents, had the
ability to better manage the turbulent times of the late nineteenth century. Of course, as
the number of recipients on the rolls went up, so did the cost each year. Yet Americans
felt a sense of duty to take care of those who had sacrificed for the nation. In this sense,
America’s wounded veterans became a national investment: an investment by the people
to take care of the wounded and needy, and an investment by politicians who recognized
not only the need to support veterans, but also the importance of having this new voting
block on their side.
From the passing of the pension act in 1862 until 1890, veterans saw their ability
to claim a pension from the government expand in great ways. Over these years the
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definition of who could file a claim, who could benefit from a claim, and the criteria
needed to be approved, all broadened making it easier for more soldiers to apply. As
dramatically changing as the General-Law period was, it represents only the first period
of expansion. In 1890, new considerations emerged that would, once again, cause a
dramatic shift in how the pension system would be defined, and who it would provide aid
for.

30

THE DEPENDENT PENSION ACT OF 1890

Since the passing of the Pension Act of 1862, the pension system for Civil War
veterans underwent various reforms over the next twenty-eight years. Whether done out
of a sense of duty to those who wore the uniform, political opportunism, or a combination
of these and other things, the result was an increased number of veterans and their
dependents receiving aid from the federal government. It also increased the cost needed
to maintain an ever-growing group of claimants, a situation that caused both Democrats
and Republicans to hotly debate the best course of action for monitoring the system.
As revolutionary in scope as the General-Law period was, legislation passed in
1890 expanded the pension system to an even greater degree. The Dependent Pension
Act (or Disability Act), passed on June 27, 1890, created a system specifically designed
for veterans of the Civil War, and relaxed previous restrictions of evidence in order to
broaden the criteria for applicants with elderly veterans in mind. Those who might obtain
a pension were:
All persons who served ninety days or more in the military or naval
service of the United States during the late war of the Rebellion and who
have been honorably discharged therefrom, and who are now or who may
hereafter by suffering from a mental or physical disability of a permanent
character, not the result of their own vicious habits, which incapacitates
them from the performance of manual labor.”74
This new law changed the nature of the pension system dramatically.
This was a measure for former soldiers of the Civil War, or “war of the
Rebellion,” who served in the Army or Navy for at least ninety days and were honorable
discharged. A soldier must have a disability that keeps him from working, but this is
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apart from the ninety day service requirement. There is no requirement that one’s
disability be the result of the war.
As discussed earlier, under the General-Law system a soldier or his dependent
had to show an abundance of proof that he not only had a debilitating injury, but that the
injury was a direct result of fighting in the Civil War. A soldier had to file his claim, get
verification from the War Department, have a federally approved doctor examine the
injuries to verify they came from the war, and even then it was not certain that the soldier
would receive a pension. Widows and mothers had to provide documentation that the
marriage was real, that the children were legitimate, and (for widows) be under moral
scrutiny to ensure there was no remarriage or cohabitation. None of these things were a
focal point anymore as a result of the Dependent Pension Act of 1890. Now all a soldier
had to do was provide proof that he served for a ninety day period and were honorably
discharged. The only other restriction is that the disability cannot be a “result of their
own vicious habits.” In other words, get drunk and fall off your horse and injure yourself
– do not try to claim a pension for that. It is also interesting that the disability can be
either “mental or physical.” If someone were to have a mental breakdown and become
insane, he was still eligible for a pension. A widow needed only to show that her
husband died – not that it had anything to do with the war. She must, however, “have
married him prior to June 27, 1890,” and be “without other means of support than her
daily labor.”75 Additional pension benefits, such as an additional two dollars for each
child, still applied as it existed before 1890.
While much of the new act helped veterans and their dependents and provided an
easier means to receive aid, the new law did not make things better in all ways. For
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example, some types of disabilities that were considered valid under the General-Law
system were no longer covered under the new act of 1890. This was because “they do
not materially interfere with the performance of manual labor.”76 If a soldier was deaf in
one ear, for instance, he would no longer be covered as he was before 1890.
Under the new act, the rating system for disabilities could, for some, be lowered
and put those affected in a difficult position. If a veteran was completely unable to
perform on the job, then the rate for total disability was twelve dollars under the new act.
While this was an improvement for a veteran who before received less than twelve
dollars for their disabilities, what about someone who received a pension at a higher rate?
According to historian William H. Glasson, it could be severely reduced: “A degree of
disability that would entitle a claimant to the thirty dollar rate under the general law is
pensioned under this act at twelve dollars per month.”77 By this new scale, a soldier could
have their pension cut by almost two-thirds.
While the act of 1890 changed the pension system with Civil War veterans in
mind, it also introduced into the pension process something that had been absent under
the General-Law system: age. Never had a soldier’s age been important when deciding
what their pension might be. Veterans applied at different times in different years, some
applying soon after the war, some applying years later. The determining factor did not
factor in the age of the soldier. Under the new law, however, the older the claimant was,
the more likely that person was guaranteed a pension. A veteran who was seventy-five
years old was eligible for a full pension “for senility alone,” and as long as a veteran was
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at least sixty-five years old, that person could do no worse than the minimum.78 In a way,
these new regulations became an extra protection for aging veterans and insured that they
received some aid into their old age.
It would not take long before additional laws were passed by Congress that
simply made a veterans age the sole requirement to receive “disability for manual
labor.”79 Of course, as the new century approached, Congress understood that veterans of
the Civil War were getting older and it became harder for them to maintain a place in the
workforce. This might help explain why politicians began using age as a determining
factor. By 1907, Congress made the age of an applicant a sole criteria by which to
receive a pension: “the age of sixty-two year and over shall be considered a permanent
specific disability within the meaning of the pension laws.”80 With the passing of laws
such as this, veteran pensions became a sort of retirement pension granted in order to care
for aging veterans and their dependents.
As one might expect, the opening up of the pension laws so that all veterans, not
just wounded ones, could be eligible for a pension brought thousands of new applicants
to the Pension Bureau. The 1890’s saw record highs in both numbers of veterans on the
pension rolls and government costs for maintaining them. In 1891, just thirty-nine
percent of all Civil War veterans received a pension. By the turn of the century that
number rose to seventy-four percent – almost double.81 The percentage of Civil War
veterans on the rolls continued to rise over the next two decades when, in 1915, the
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number of Civil War veterans receiving a pension reached ninety-three percent.82 By
extending the pension laws and making it easier for veterans to get aid, Congress had
gone about as far as it could go in regard to lending a hand to veterans.
As the number of veterans on the rolls increased, so did the cost. In response to
the growing need pay for veteran pensions, the 1890’s saw the first billion dollar
Congress. By the end of the century, America was spending over forty percent of its
annual budget on pension payments. This put a great strain on the national economy at a
time when the country faced other financial hardships as well. This caused the political
fervor around the issue of helping veterans to lessen as neither party, not even
Republican, liked reminding people of the growing cost of supporting former soldiers.
This was one of the great weaknesses of the 1890 law, pointed out by Glasson,
which by making a pension available to anyone who served ninety days did not seem too
many to be fair. What if the person who applied did not really need a pension to help
with his finances? What if they were well off with plenty of means to provide a home for
their family and take care of their needs? According to the law, this did not matter. The
law made no distinction between a rich man and a poor man. By this measure, a man
from a prominent, wealthy family, who never saw combat a day in his life because he
was stationed somewhere far away from the fighting, could sustain an injury that took
away his ability to perform manual labor and receive a monthly pension for the rest of his
life. The injury did not have to be related to military service. All he had to do was show
he served for ninety days and receive certification from a government doctor that his
injury was debilitating to the point of inability to perform labor. A pension could be
obtained, even if the person did not need it.
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For Glasson, and others, this was a flaw in the system. The system moved away
from being one of aid and comfort to the poor, disabled veterans who served the nation
because whether one was poor or rich was no longer taken into consideration. It put the
rich and the poor on the same level – just as it put someone who saw the worst and most
horrific battles on the same level as someone stationed at a fort in Washington D.C. who
never once heard a shot fired from a hostile enemy.
Despite its weaknesses, the Dependent Pension Act of 1890 ushered in the second
crucial period after the General-Law system in 1862. It expanded the pension system
beyond simply caring for wounded veterans and established a type of military retirement
plan for elderly soldiers who were growing too old to work by the end of the century. In
so doing, the military pension system became one of the greatest social programs in the
history of America – or as Megan McClintock described it, a “social welfare program of
vast dimensions.”83 However, aid for America’s veterans was not just limited to
dispersing a monthly fee. There was another system of care for the most needy of
veterans – a second system of care that would go hand-in-hand with the pension system.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VETERAN HOMES

When considering how best to help veterans, one group arose that could not be
ignored: soldiers unable to care for themselves even with a pension. Unfortunately, by the
time of the Civil War, former soldiers who could not live on their own were often left to
find residence in an asylum – a place that many looked down on as a refuge of those who
lived off the charity of others. Yet former soldiers who sacrificed for their country were
not the same as someone living off the kindness of others. They had earned the right to
receive help from their country and many officials recognized the importance of making
sure veterans who needed assisted living would get it.
Yet Congress also recognized that providing care meant more than simply
building structures throughout the country. It also meant striving to remove the negative
stigma attached to the word “asylum.” The National Asylum Board, created by Congress
during the Civil War to devise a national system of care for wounded soldiers, wanted to
change the discourse by referring to the new residence for soldiers as “homes.”84 It
understood that by making it about building new “homes” for veterans, more support
could be generated not only in Congress, but from a populace who wished to provide aid
and comfort for those who sacrificed, as well as for their dependents. Eventually, in
1873, Congress “officially changed the name of this system to the National Home for
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers (NHDVS)”85 The decision to give the new organization a
domestic feel helped shape public opinion and support so that both federal and state
officials could work together in creating it.
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There was a stigma attached to the word “asylum” and the officials worried that
soldiers would “equate the National Asylum with the poorhouse.”86 These bad
perceptions were an early obstacle not easily overcome. Even though poorhouses dated
back to the colonial period, and were meant to act as a means of reforming as well as
helping those who resided in them, by the start of the Civil War these places were little
more than shelters for America’s poor. These poorhouses could be found in cities all
across the country and sheltered not only men, but women and children as well – and
they were not good places in which to find oneself.
Many viewed poorhouses as nothing more than a den of thieves, full of men who
looked to take advantage of the system in order to get a free ride (much similar to some
arguments in modern times against government assistance). In this way, former veterans
and their families, as well as others who really benefited from aid, were lumped in with
those of an unsavory nature. National Asylum officials did not want the new facilities
meant to help veterans seen in this light. It therefore became an “immediate priority of
the Board of Managers of the National Asylum” to assure “veterans and the general
public that the federal sanctuary created for ex-soldiers differed fundamentally from the
local poorhouse.”87 It was important that veterans and their families receive a higher level
of care separate from other institutions or charitable asylums.
Here is an example, however, where political ambition played a somewhat
positive role in the establishment of veteran homes. While the failure of past attempts to
help house the veterans of previous wars were still well within memory of veterans, and
the skepticism it aroused in veterans against any potential attempt in the future, the newly
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in power Republican party wanted to be seen as having the ability to fix the old problems
and develop a system of veteran housing that actually worked. To be sure, Republicans
cared about the brave soldiers who fought for the Union, but they also cared about their
own political careers as well. This dual drive of wanting to help both the soldiers and
their own political careers motivated many Republicans to push cooperation with state
agents in order to establish new homes for veterans.
In his article “Establishing a Federal Entitlement,” historian Patrick J. Kelly gives
a good insight into why board officials pushed to change the language away from
“asylum” and to “homes.” In the late nineteenth century, the “home” was seen as the
domain of the woman – the husband was considered by many as the primary bread
winner, but the home was where the wife took care of things. The “home” was a private
place where one received care and sanctuary. This was the ideal that Asylum Board
members wanted to portray about the new homes for veterans. As Kelly points out, these
new homes where a new equivalent for the mother or wife – a veteran home was where a
former soldier received “food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, as mother and wives
assumed for their families.”88 In a sense, the government took the role of a mother to the
wounded children who had served her.
Even though the desired perception the NHDVS wished to portray was one of a
caring “home,” that did not mean a true “home” was what they had in mind regarding the
dependents of veterans. The new veteran homes were designed to accommodate men
exclusively, not their dependents. Women, children, and mothers were not given any
special status on their own. While they did receive pension benefits, these were
contingent on the man, whether that man be a husband, father, or son. Even though from
88
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1862 to 1874 “the number of dependents receiving pension checks…slightly surpassed
the number of ex-soldiers receiving pension,” the NHDVS considered the new homes as
places for veteran care and no one else.89
This exclusion of wives and children did not last long. Congress quickly realized
that keeping a recovering soldiers wife and children away from him and forcing them to
live somewhere else did little to help the recovery process. It also discouraged many
veterans from wanting to seek help in a veteran’s home because none liked the idea of
being separated from their families. Not wanting to alienate the soldiers with whom they
were seeking to help, board officials devised a plan in which separate “detached cabins”
would be built on the grounds by the homes in order that a veteran and his family could
stay together.90 After all, it was reasoned, what better way to promote healing and
“home” than by making sure families stayed together?
One of the key figures in the establishment and reform of the National Asylums
into National Homes was Benjamin Butler, a veteran of the Civil War himself. Butler
recognized early that not only did the asylum institution need to be changed to better give
veterans the care they needed, but that the government did not do enough for dependents.
Butler was one of the main leaders that helped shape the NHDVS into a successful
system for veterans. In fact, he helped improve the system to the point that “by 1876, ten
years after its founding, the system had sheltered nearly twenty thousand men.”91 Butler
helped change the minds of ex-soldiers who were hesitant about leaving their families in
order to go into one of the homes.
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Congress, however, did not change the system to allow family members to join
veterans in the homes, despite the urging of men like Butler. The dependents of an exsoldier might be eligible to receive a pension, but they were not eligible to receive any of
the further benefits a soldier was.
This reveals something about the government and the system of care that it gave
to its former soldiers – two different forms of aid developed for veterans.92 The first
being a pension for service injuries incurred during the war (amended in 1890 to simply
serving at least 90 days), and the second was a system of government run assisted living
homes that provided support and medical care for recovering veterans. In other words, a
veteran could not only apply to receive a monthly pension, he could also join a veterans
home that provided them with the comfort and medical care they needed to recover and
live their lives again.
This kind of assistance was crucial in the aftermath of the Civil War. Hundreds of
thousands had perished and many more suffered terribly from service in it. Homes were
destroyed and families ripped apart. Yet, the United States government did not abandon
its citizen volunteer soldiers after they went back home. The government took steps to
ensure that these men, and their dependents, were provided for. This was a key step in
the recovery process of the nation.
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UNBALANCED SCALE: BARRIERS FOR BLACK APPLICANTS

In all the various forms of the pension system that developed over the years from
1862 to 1890 and beyond, Congress (especially when it was a Republican controlled
Congress) intended its measures for pension care to apply to all military men who wore
the uniform and needed aid. Ideally, race was not to be a factor in determining which
veterans deserved a pension. As long as an applicant showed the appropriate evidence
that he was, in fact, a veteran with a disability, then the government agreed to provide
him with a monthly pension.
This was an attempt by the government to keep the ever changing pension laws
neutral on the issue of race. After all, black soldiers suffered and died just like white
soldiers did in defense of the Union and earned their right to a pension just like white
soldiers. As one Congressional committee put it, there is “no reason why the heirs of
colored soldiers should not be put on the same footing as to bounty and pensions as the
heirs of white soldiers, and many reasons why they should.”93 While racism still existed
throughout the country, at least in the pension laws Congress understood that soldiers,
both white and black, should be viewed on equal footing.
Yet despite all attempts at equal treatment through the law, the percentage of
black claimants and their dependents who received a pension was much lower than that
of whites. An examination conducted by Donald R. Shaffer on a sample of pension
claims shows that “92 percent of white Union veterans…made at least one successful
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application, compared to only around 75 percent of former black soldiers.”94 In addition,
Shaffer also notes that “nearly 84 percent of the white widows managed to receive
pensions, while only around 61 percent of African American widows made at least one
successful application.”95 How could that be? In a system designed to be neutral on the
subject of color, why was there such a disparity in the success rate between white
veterans and black veterans?
One main reason for this, as pointed out by historians Larry M. Logue and Peter
Blanck, is that while the laws may have been color-blind, the people administering the
pension laws were not. The racist attitudes toward black men and women still prevailed
after the conclusion of the Civil War, and many officials simply did not view black
people as equal. As Logue and Blanck put it, “they were at once devious (‘those of that
race who can be counted reliable and absolutely truthful, are a rarity indeed’) and
naïve.”96 These attitudes affected how an application by a black veteran or his dependents
got processed and, in the long run, whether or not it was approved.
Shaffer points out an additional reason for the disparity of success between white
and black soldiers – “special disadvantages.”97 The majority of black applicants had
difficulty in meeting the criteria laid out by the Pension Bureau for things such as proving
their identity or, for the widow, proving a valid marriage existed. Having to demonstrate
their worthiness, as well as provide proper documentation, when combined with the
inherent racism and bigotry held by administration officials left many African American
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veterans at a serious disadvantage when applying for a pension that caused many to be
rejected.
It must be stressed again that the pension application process was not easy. There
were a number of steps to the process that made it not only time consuming, but costly.
First, a veteran sent his application, which detailed his military service and the nature of
his disability, to the Pension Bureau. The Pension Bureau then made a request to the War
Department to verify the information given by the applicant, and could also ask for
additional confirmation from the applicant in the form of testimony from fellow soldiers
and commanding officers. Once the first step was completed, the second step required
the applicant to undergo an examination from a government approved doctor who
determined the validity of the disability and rated the level of the disability. Finally, the
Pension Bureau either determined what the monthly payment was or rejected the claim.
This was a lengthy process form the beginning, and a risky one. A veteran might
go through this entire process and still be rejected. An applicant could file a new claim as
additional disabilities arose, but this was an additional cost to a process that was already
taxing on most applicants. These expenses were burdensome for all veterans, but even
more so for African Americans – especially those who were former slaves. White
veterans did not face the problems of identity, literacy, and cost to the same degree that
African American veterans did.
For example, the first step in the application process dealt with proving the
identity of the applicant – who was he and where did he serve? Just this first step was a
difficult obstacle for many African American veterans for several reasons. The first was
the name used by ex-slaves who fought in the army. As Shaffer points out, “many former
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slaves joined the army under their master’ last names but after the war took new
surnames to assert family connections and their identity as free men.”98 This did not just
stop with the veterans. It was possible for members of the same family to have different
surnames, which made proving family connections more difficult. If the mother of a son
who fought with the United States Colored Troops had a different surname than her son,
this proved to be an additional hurdle as well.
There were also cases of African Americans joining the army under a false name
in order to hide their identity from anyone looking for them – whether it be because they
were runaways, or perhaps they joined without the blessing of their pro-Union owners.
This caused problems with the application process because the War Department looked
for the name used during service in the army. If the new surname used by a black veteran
did not match the name he gave during the war, his claim might be rejected or, at the
least, be severely delayed. The Pension Bureau could send someone to investigate the
claim, but this could delay approval for weeks or even years.
Even something as simple as a date of birth, which most people take for granted,
was a huge obstacle for African American veterans. Many former slaves did not know
their date of birth, usually because records no longer existed or because their “owners had
deliberately kept such knowledge from them.”99 This became crucial as age became more
important for determining a pension. In 1907, “Congress made old age itself…the legal
basis for a pension,” which it defined as sixty-two years of age – an age that included
most Civil War veterans.100 This was an important change because the older you were,
the more pension money you could collect each month. If a former slave who fought for
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the Union could not validate his date of birth, this alone could cause his claim to be
rejected or delayed. White veterans did not face this kind of obstacle.
Literacy was one of the most difficult obstacles for African American veterans to
overcome. This is an area where the effects of slavery on former slaves can be clearly
seen; where place of birth can, as Logue and Blanck point out, be the “basis of an
excellent proxy for gauging postwar African-American deprivation.”101 Just being able to
complete an application for black veterans proved to be a difficult obstacle. Any mistake
in filling out the proper forms would delay the claim. Further still, since they were not
able to read, if an agent or someone hired to help with the application misspelled the
name of an applicant, the veteran filing the claim could not tell and this could also delay
the claim or even cause its rejection.
According to the census of 1860, “99.6 percent of the black population in the
thirteen southern states…were slaves.”102 This was a population that was forbidden, by
law in most southern states, to learn how to read and write. They were deprived of any
kind of knowledge that could prepare them for life outside of slavery because their
masters saw their education as a potential problem. Whereas nearly two-thirds of African
Americans born in free states could read and write by 1870, only 13 percent of African
Americans born in slaves states could do likewise.103
This meant that black veterans who were from slave states usually had to hire
someone to fill out the forms for them. This meant the hiring of an intermediary such as
a lawyer or a claim agent (someone who might be a lawyer or might be someone looking
to earn extra money). This was an additional cost that most black veterans could not
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afford. Yet without these lawyers and agents, most illiterate black veterans would never
have been able to apply at all.
Unfortunately, while there were a good many lawyers who helped many black
veterans receive the pension due them, many lawyers and agents did a terrible job helping
their clients. A good number presented false evidence and false documentation in order
to get a claim approved. Others, as will be shown later, did the disservice of depriving
back pay and bounty money from veterans and their families by claiming to have paid the
families what was due them, and them keeping the money for themselves.
If a black veteran or his dependents were able to deal with the extra expense
required to hire a lawyer to aid in the application process, the next hurdle would be the
examination by an officially sanctioned medical examiner. These examiners were
located throughout the country, but in specific cities. This means that in order to comply
with the examination process many veterans, both black and white, had to travel to the
examiner that was closest to them. In other words, if a veteran wanted to be examined,
they had to come up with the money to travel, and some had to cover long distances.
While this was a burden for white veterans and their families as well, when one considers
that the average annual income for a black family was only $250 (which was not all that
much), one can see how having to come up with extra money for lawyers and travel
became an overwhelming burden for black veterans and their families.104
As challenging a problem as extensive extra costs and low literacy was for black
veterans, most pension historians trace the main obstacle for black veteran pension claims
to the examining doctors and bureau administrators who were to oversee the process. A
great many bureau agents did not like African American veterans and viewed their claims
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with greater suspicion than they gave to white applicants. Each time an agent had
problems with verifying the name of an applicant, or had problems receiving proper
documentation, or even getting an applicant to remember a specific date, the agent
viewed the claim with more skepticism.
This greater scrutiny shown toward the claims of black veterans and their
dependents was not extended to the claims of white veterans. In fact, as Shaffer pointed
out, deficiencies with white claimants were given a pass more often than black claimants:
“While pension bureaucrats more often overlooked defects in white pension cases, they
were less likely to do so for African Americans or to give them the benefit of the
doubt.”105 This was even more true in the General-Law period before 1890 when “black
applicants were less than one-third as likely as white veterans to be approved” for a
pension. In other words, black veterans had to work extra hard and go to extraordinary
lengths to get approval from a system that was supposed to treat them as equals.
As mentioned above, it was not just the bureau agents who discriminated against
black claimants. The medical examiners did so as well. They, too, were more likely to
reject the claims of a black soldier who struggled to provide the proper documentation a
white soldier could. Even if they did provide the proper forms, as Logue and Blanck
revealed, it did not always mean they would receive verification from an examiner: “Not
even black veterans with military records of service-related trauma to support their cases
or with the rank of corporal or sergeant…were as likely as their white peers to receive a
pension.”106 Medical examiners were not as bad as bureau agents in terms of their
willingness to distrust black claims, but their racism and bigotry, when added to that of
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the bureau agents, created yet another obstacle for black veterans to have to overcome
that white applicants did not have to face.
For many agents, the mere fact that an applicant was a black man, or one of his
dependents, was enough to turn them against the claim.107 This is not to say that all white
applicants were approved and all black applicants were rejected, but there was an
inherent amount of racism within the Pension Bureau that made it more likely that a
black applicant would be denied the pension they deserved.
This additional racism and prejudice that made it harder for black veterans to
receive their pensions had lasting effects beyond just a denial of pension funds. This put
the lives of veterans at risk. If a black applicant had a serious disability and needed help,
a rejection of his claim could shorten his life. A widow or mother who was dependent on
the soldier to provide for them could be left helpless to take care of themselves without
great struggle. For a black veteran to be awarded the pension they deserved could
improve their lives and the lives of their families.
In other words, “pensions were associated with longevity.”108 An improved
quality of life, through the aid of a pension, meant a longer life. This is what a racist
medical examiner or pension agent put at risk. As Logue and Blank pointed out, “if
pension officials’ evaluations had not been susceptible to the race of applicants, some
veterans’ time ‘on this side of the grave’ would have been prolonged.”109
Not only was the health of the veteran put at risk, but also the potential for
providing a better life in the future for their families. Consider this example, at the time
of the census of 1900, roughly half of all African Americans who drew a pension owned
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their own homes. By contrast, of those African American veterans who were not
awarded a pension by the 1900 census, less than a third owned their own home.110
Having the support of a pension not only meant a chance at a better life in the present, but
meant having something to leave behind for your family so that they might have a better
future.
Difficulties within the pension system affected both white and black applicants.
The process could be long and difficult, taking many years, and still result in an applicant
being rejected for various reasons. Yet African American veterans not only faced the
same difficulties as white applicants, they faced additional obstacles as a result of the
system of slavery – a system that left the overwhelming majority of former slaves without
the ability to read and write; without the ability to provide adequate information about
their date of birth, marriage records, or the funds necessary to pay for lawyers and travel
expenses.
Combine these extra hurdles with a Pension Bureau laced with racism and
prejudice and it is not hard to understand why so few black veterans applied for a pension
in the early years after the Civil War. Nor is it surprising that the success rate for black
veterans was so much lower than their white peers. Yet as unbalanced as the system was
in regard to fairness, this injustice came from an external source – the government. More
disturbing is the injustice committed against black veterans and their families by the men
they hired to help them: their lawyers. Men who gained the confidence of these families
and offered their assistance in gaining the money owed to them, and then took from these
families at a time when they needed help the most.
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What follows is an example of just such an injustice – an injustice that saw the
pain and suffering faced by the families of black veterans in the wake of the Civil War
multiplied and enhanced by those who sought to take advantage – and injustice that
would make its way to the highest court in the land, only to find that the court offered no
protection from fraud and theft. The trials of Louis Benecke were an episode in the past
that reveal the lengths one group of men would go to in order to create additional
obstacles for black veterans for their own gain.
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CAPTAIN LOUIS BENECKE

As mentioned in the previous section, a good many African American veterans
and their families, especially those who lived in former slave states, often lacked the
ability to read and write. To help with their applications, these veterans and their families
turned to a lawyer or a claim agent – someone who specialized in helping veterans file
the appropriate forms for their pension – to send off the application for them, for a fee.
These agents acted as the intermediary and handled all contact with the Pension Bureau.
It was their job to make sure the application met all requirements for approval, and then,
in cases of retrieving back pay and bounties due, collect the money from the Bureau and
give it to the person who made the claim.
One such person who acted as an intermediary agent for the families of African
American soldiers was a man named Louis Benecke. After the Civil War, Benecke, and
some close colleagues who joined him in his practice, represented a number of veterans
who fought for the Union and their families for all back pay and bounties due them.
They also assisted in setting up their pension claims. Benecke’s role was to make sure
the claims were properly filled out, receive the money due from back pay and bounties,
then, after collecting his fee, disperse the money to the veteran or family member he
represented.
Benecke, however, did not comply with this arrangement for some of his clients.
Instead of turning over the money sent to him from the Pension Bureau to the families, he
kept it, while at the same time claiming that he paid all money due to the families in full.
This resulted in Benecke being indicted on 10 counts of “wrongfully withholding back
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pay and bounty” from veterans and their families.111 These indictments led Benecke, a
man of otherwise good standing in his community, into the first of his trials – trials that
would end in front of the United States Supreme Court.
Louis Benecke was born May 1, 1843 in Stiege, Germany. He was the son of
Heinrich Ludwig Theodore Benecke and Johanna Auguste Bock, German immigrants
who settled in Brunswick, Missouri in 1856.112 Louis’s father had been a teacher and
forest supervisor in Germany, but due to his democratic leaning political views decided to
come with his family to America. Louis attended only three months of high school
before finding work to help his family. In the years leading up to the war, Louis worked
as a clerk at the Hotel Harry House and William Ladd & Co., a dry goods store. It was at
Ladd & Co. that Louis learned book-keeping and first began studying law.113
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Benecke decided to join the Union company
that formed in his town – a company he happily joined as the tactics he saw there were
similar to those he learned as a student of Blankenburg College in Germany. It is
difficult to say just how much military experience Benecke gained at Blankenburg since
he was only there one year and did not graduate, unlike his brother Robert who did. In
any case, Benecke jumped at the opportunity to serve as a loyal Union man. He was
seventeen years old.114
However, Benecke’s newly formed Union company was not as it first appeared to
the new young soldier. After leaving town by steamboat in order to report to a military
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camp to begin drill instruction, Benecke’s company received new orders to report to
Lexington, Missouri. The following morning after arriving in Lexington, Benecke awoke
to a shock. The commander of the forces gathered at Lexington gave orders that the
American flag be taken down and replaced with “a new strange flag.”115 The commander
then gave orders “requiring all to take a new oath which left out the clause ‘to support the
Constitution of the United States.’”116 This was not what Benecke signed up for.
Benecke’s “Union” company was part of the State Militia commanded by former
Missouri governor Sterling Price. While publicly neutral, Price had given his allegiance
to the Confederacy and turned the Missouri State Militia into a virtual arm of the
Confederate army. When Benecke received the order to take the new oath he refused and
sought out Price to inform him that he did not wish to fight against the Union. Price
granted any man who did not wish to take the new oath permission to leave the camp and
asked those who wished to do this to step forward. Benecke and several others did, under
tremendous jeers and threats from the remaining troops. According to Benecke, he and
the others that stepped forward “were marched back to our quarters, and then and there
stripped of our uniform and left without any clothing other than our drawers and
shirts.”117 After gaining some new clothes in Lexington, Benecke began the long walk
back to Brunswick.
Despite the negative beginning to his military career, Benecke promptly joined in
the organization of the 18th Missouri Volunteer Infantry, which was a new regiment
formed in Brookfield, Missouri. According to Benecke, the regiment did not wait long
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until it tasted success. During a celebration of the Fourth of July, 1861, at the Filzer
Farm outside of Brunswick, Benecke, many of his new recruits and local men and women
gathered to drink lager and enjoy the Fourth – “enough lager beer to become less fearless
and more than ordinarily patriotic.”118
When the men at the party discovered that the beer had all been consumed, a
“squad” was sent to the local brewery in town to obtain more. One of the men decided to
carry the American flag as the squad marched off – something quickly noticed by another
company of men already in town. This other company was a pro-Confederate company
who practiced their drills on Broadway Street in Brunswick, although the men practicing
were doing so without any rifles with them. When they saw this Union squad marching
into town waving the American flag, they “imagined that the St. Louis Dutch had arrived,
and at once broke ranks, and at a double-quick went up the Seminary hill into the
woods.”119 Apparently, the fleeing men did not realize that these Union men were
without weapons as well.
The success of the Brunswick Beer Invasion might strike the reader as a peculiar
event – one of those odd things that happened during the Civil War. Yet Benecke
described the event as “the first capture of Brunswick without arms and without a
fight.”120 It seems strange that Benecke would describe the event, which amounted to
little more than a glorified beer-run, as the “first capture” of the town of Brunswick. It is
possible this was an attempt at humor (he does speak of the second capture that took
place two days later by a Union unit after writing of this event), but there is nothing to
indicate that his description of the event as a capturing of the town was a joke. While
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humor may have been his intention, it may also reveal another side to Benecke – a side
that is not afraid to misrepresent events to make them seem grander than they were.
As relatively uneventful as his military experience was in 1861, although it was a
bit odd at times, 1862 was the complete opposite as Benecke’s military experience took a
dark turn. Benecke and his fellow soldiers of Company H, 18th Missouri Volunteer
Infantry were part of the Union campaign moving south down the Mississippi River into
Confederate-held territory. He participated in the taking of Island No. 10, a Confederate
stronghold near New Madrid, Missouri, designed to guard the Mississippi from the
North, and afterwards moved into Tennessee as part of General U.S. Grant’s Union
forces at the Battle of Shiloh.121
At Shiloh, Benecke’s regiment became one of the units defending the Hornet’s
Nest during the first day of fighting on April 6. He was among those troops captured by
the Confederate army at 5:30 pm and sent south.122 Benecke spent the next “seven
terrible long months” moving from various prison camps throughout the South – a period
described by Benecke as “the saddest part of my military service.”123 He notes that this
time also resulted in his acquiring “disabilities,” but he does not go into detail about what
those disabilities were.124 Whatever his disabilities were, they were enough to ensure his
being honorably discharged after a prisoner exchange near Richmond, Virginia.
Benecke’s injuries did not keep him out of the war entirely, however, as the
wounded teenager returned home to Brunswick to receive care. He spent the next two
years recovering from the injuries at his family home. In 1864, Benecke rejoined the war
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effort by enlisting in Company E, 35th Enrolled Missouri Militia (E.M.M.) and, due to his
previous experience, was made first lieutenant. This new company was headquartered at
Keytesville, Missouri, and it was their job to patrol the area of Chariton County –
Benecke’s home county – for any Confederate guerillas that might be operating in the
area.125
Benecke did not remain a first lieutenant long. The man in charge of Company E,
35th E.M.M. was Captain Joseph Stanley. Stanley owned a farm in the northern part of
Chariton County and decided to make a trip home one day without taking any men with
him for protection. Once there, his home was attacked by a group of Confederate raiders
and Stanley was taken prisoner. The Confederates agreed to spare Stanley’s life and
grant him a parole in exchange for his vow to leave the Union army and to “keep the
volunteer militia company in camp so as to allow the bushwhackers free hand and recruit
for the Confederate service without molestation.”126 Stanley complied with the first
demand and left the army. As to the second demand, that now fell to the new commander
of the company, Louis Benecke, whom Stanley put in charge before leaving. Benecke,
however, had no intention of leaving his home county to the mercy of Confederate
guerillas. He was soon promoted to captain, and did not waste time showing his ability to
hunt Confederate guerillas.
Once in command, Benecke immediately set out to attack a Confederate company
he learned was planning to cross the Missouri River at the town of Frankfort.127 He
planned a night attack that occurred on August 7, 1864, and drove the Confederate
company off, capturing horses, a wagon load of ammunition, and two prisoners. This
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raid helped establish Benecke as a capable commander not just in the eyes of his
superiors, but in the eyes of the people of Chariton County as well. For the remainder of
the war, Benecke’s role in the army was to maintain Chariton County and keep all enemy
raiders out – to protect the people and towns in and around his home county.
Benecke was largely successful at this and won the admiration of the people of
Chariton County who saw him as a man to restore order. This can be seen in an excerpt
from an editorial that appeared in the Missouri Republican in November 1864:
We are glad, however, to learn that lately changes have been made in the
command, and that there is a hope indulged by those directly interested,
that this will tend to restore quiet and order to that distracted county. The
militia, stationed in Chariton County (sic) for some seeks past, is placed
under the command of Captain Benecke, a young, but active, experienced,
and efficient officer. Those who know him, speak of him as a man and
officer, in terms of the highest commendation.128
And it was not just those who supported the Union who received Benecke’s
protection and aid. Even those who supported the South were treated with respect by
Benecke who made sure that they received badly needed supplies during such a chaotic
time. “It is now a source of gratification to me,” writes Benecke, “to know that I had the
opportunity of securing relief to many, the political opinions of whose fathers, husbands
or brothers were opposed to those of my own.”129 It was the ability to show fairness, as
well as to maintain law and order, that people remembered about him – traits that they
remembered in the years after the war as well.
Benecke’s war record was quite good. His list of accomplishments elevated him
and made him into a prominent figure in Chariton County. After he and his company
were mustered out of the army on August 2, 1865, Benecke returned home to Brunswick
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only to find it in an uneasy state after the war. While Benecke attests to a common
understanding between the returning soldiers from both sides – each side understanding
who won the war and now it was time to move on – the problem came from the “stay-athome fellows who were just getting ready to fight” who were causing problems.130
The good people of Brunswick were dissatisfied with the mayor for not doing
more to put an end to the trouble. Once Benecke returned home, the townspeople
immediately suggested that he should run for mayor. After all, Benecke had proven his
ability to maintain order during the war. He did so and became the new mayor of
Brunswick in 1866.131 That was a busy year for Benecke, for not only was he elected
mayor, he was also elected justice of the peace and admitted to the Bar of Chariton
County – and he was still in his early twenties.132
Despite his good war performance and the various commendations he received,
Benecke did recall two instances during the war when accusations were made and
charges were brought against him for knowingly allowing his men to kill enemy
prisoners. Although Benecke refers to the first instance as being perpetrated by
“irresponsible parties” and of the second as mere “malicious rumor,” it was enough of an
incident to require his appearance before a court of inquiry in the first case, and to cause
Benecke to investigate the second to clear his name.133 He had built his post-war political
career off of his war record – he could not allow that record to be tarnished.
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The first instance involved charges that Benecke “had killed or caused to be killed
a peaceful citizen named Charles Paul.”134 Paul was arrested by Benecke’s men when
they found him carrying a revolver and going under the alias, Charles Bauer. Benecke’s
men then promptly turned Paul over to the 17th Illinois Cavalry for transport to a prisoner
of war camp. Sometime during the trip, Paul attempted to escape and was killed in the
attempt. Some charged Benecke with being complicit with the act, but it was quickly
shown that Paul was killed while in custody of the 17th Illinois Cavalry, not Benecke’s
men. In his book, written many years after the events in order to help clear his name,
Benecke reprints the report given by General Clinton B. Fisk, which stated that Benecke
was “in no way responsible for the killing.”135 According to the findings of the inquiry,
the charges were completely false.
The second instance did not result in a second inquiry, but it did produce rumors
that bothered Benecke a great deal. So much so that he investigated the matter himself in
the years after the war just so he could clear his name from any scandal. To Benecke,
these accusations were merely an attempt to destroy his credibility – vicious rumors put
forth by “sneaks and cowards” whose “sole object was to poison the minds and prejudice
the parties against myself.”136
The incident, as recounted by Benecke in a special section at the end of his book,
began on August 8, 1864, when a Union soldier named William Carter of Company B,
35th Regiment, E.M.M., was visiting his mother at the family farm just outside of
Keytesville, Missouri. Carter’s mother was ill and he went alone to take care of her.
While at his farm, he was ambushed by a Confederate “bushwhacker” named Jim
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Jackson.137 Jackson, and his “gang,” took Carter to a nearby tree, stripped him naked, and
tied him to the tree for target practice. Carter was “shot at by the gang till his body was
riddled with over thirty bullets, and he was then left dead, still tied to the tree.”138 This is
how Carter was found by Union troops who came looking for him.
Several months later, Union troops captured John W. Leonard, a man believed to
have taken part in the murder of Carter. Leonard was captured by scouts under
Benecke’s command and held as a prisoner. He was later found shot and his body
dumped in a nearby river. It was claimed that Leonard had tried to escape and the
soldiers guarding him had no choice. Benecke’s enemies said this incident happened
with his knowledge and approval.
Benecke, however, goes to great lengths in his account to show that he was
somewhere else on a scout at the time of Leonard’s murder. He reprints sworn testimony
by some of the men involved that states he was not present and that the man left in
charge, first lieutenant Fredow B. Wrockloff, took Leonard from the place he had been
held and never returned with him.139 Benecke also reprints a scout record that shows he
left on a scout the same day Leonard was captured and brought in.140 Although, there is
not agreement between the record and some of the testimony about where Benecke was at
the time of the incident (one soldier testified that Benecke was on a scout by Macon City,
while the scout record indicates that he was sent to Lake Creek).141
It must be pointed out, however, that while these records and accounts are useful
in proving Benecke was not present when Leonard “escaped” and was found dead, they
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do not reveal whether or not Benecke approved of the act at the time. He certainly
condemns the event, but does so not because a group of Union soldiers killed a man in
revenge and threw his body in a river, he condemns it because people blamed him for the
actions of his men. He did not want his reputation tarnished because of the actions of a
few men serving under him. Whether or not he actually disapproved of the revenge
killing of John W. Leonard is not clear.
Despite these two incidents, Benecke’s military career was very successful and he
was seen as a capable commander – a man who could get things done and maintain order.
After returning home in 1865, he built a successful political career and became one of the
most prominent citizens in Brunswick. He was not only elected mayor, justice of the
peace, and admitted to the bar in 1866, he would go on in the second half of the 1860’s to
be elected Director of Public School, Trustee of the German Lutheran Church of
Brunswick, delegate to the State Republican Convention in 1868, and Director of B. & C.
Railroad, just to name a few.142 He would even be reelected mayor in 1869 and then
immediately resign because he was also elected a state senator the same year.
Among the great many accomplishments and public appointments Benecke
received in the late 1860’s, he also began another practice – using his legal experience to
begin helping veterans of the Civil War, and their families, apply for pensions and all
back pay and bounty money due them. Benecke had a large number of clients, a good
portion of who were African American veterans, who sought his help and whose files
Benecke kept. These files, which are now in the State Historical Society of Missouri,
contain personal information, receipts, and other various information on those he offered
to help represent.
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It is curious, however, that while listing his many accomplishments and noting the
changes that occur during the 1860’s, Benecke never once mentions his practice of
helping former Civil War veterans, like himself, collect pensions and back pay from the
government. He mentions being a part of the School Board, Mayor, Director of the B. &
C. Railroad, even Trustee of the Brunswick Lutheran Church – yet he does not share
anything about his legal practice, apart from mentioning his admission to the Chariton
County bar in 1866.143
This omission could be because Benecke merely wanted to present a list of his
important political and business appointments and did not feel his private practice was
worth mentioning with the rest. However, the omission could also be because it was
during this time that Benecke began to take advantage of a good number of his clients –
his African American clients, former Civil War veterans and their families. As will be
shown, Benecke, along with some of his colleagues, began withholding money from the
families of his clients – money for back payments and promised bounties from the war.
This withholding of money would lead Benecke into an indictment that resulted in
his being put on trial in federal court. However, before introducing the trial, an
introduction to his clients and their backstory will help provide better context for the
ensuing trials of Louis Benecke.
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THE CLIENTS

When given the opportunity to do so, a great number of African Americans
stepped forward to volunteer for the Union Army during the Civil War. These brave men
recognized that the moment had come for them to strike back against not only the unjust
institution of slavery, but at the region of the country that promoted it and justified it on
the grounds of white supremacy. Their bravery and sacrifice was pivotal to the war effort
and as part of the United States Colored Troops (USCT) these men earned their right to
be called citizens of America.
Yet, as mentioned previously, these veterans and their families met numerous
hurdles in their struggle to obtain the pension benefits they rightly earned. Two key
elements added to this struggle: illiteracy and poverty. The average African American
household did not earn a great deal of money. Add to this the extra expense of travel for
doctors and application fees and one can start to see how the process of applying for a
pension could be long and costly. Add further still that most African Americans who
lived in a slave state could not read or write, and therefore needed to hire a lawyer to help
them.
Despite these obstacles, a great many African American veterans and their
families were willing to hire a lawyer to help them – after all, if they had a legitimate
claim for a pension, then every dollar from the government made a difference in the wake
of a tragedy like the Civil War. Louis Benecke was that lawyer for many veterans and
their families in Chariton County. Benecke does not discuss any aspect of this legal help
in his book, but his personal records contain the files on his African American clients.

64

One of those clients involved with his eventual indictment was Emma Warden.
According to the hand written copy of the indictment against Benecke, Warden had lived
in Missouri for the past ten years and was the widow of Private Asbury Warden who
served in Company D, 65th Regiment, USCT.144 In 1869, Emma Warden filed a pension
claim over her husband’s service and for all back pay and bounty money due. She saw
Benecke at his office in Brunswick and hired him to make out all the appropriate forms
for her. Benecke agreed to help her and, after writing up the correct documents, sent
Warden’s claim in to the Pension Bureau.
Benecke’s contact with the Pension Bureau was through a man named Franklin A.
Seely, a supervising agent in the St. Louis office of the Bureau. On December 23, 1869,
Seely received approval for Warden’s claim. All back pay and bounty money due to
Asbury Warden was to be paid to his widow in the amount of “One hundred and twenty
two and twenty three hundredths Dollars.”145 This was not the date of payment, only the
date of approval of the claim. In 1869, much like the present, government agencies
tended to take a good deal of time getting things done and the enhanced scope that the
Civil War brought to the Pension Bureau added to the wait time.
It was not until April 13 of the following year that Seely received the funds for
Warden. Yet, instead of sending the money directly to Emma Warden, Seely sent
payment of one hundred eight dollars and ninety-eight cents to Louis Benecke (the
indictment does not specify where the missing $13.25 went, possibly for fees).146 This is
how the system of payment worked – if a claimant was assisted by a lawyer, as in the
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case of Emma Warden, then instead of sending the money directly to the claimant, the
agent (Seely) would pay all money due to the lawyer representing them.147 Benecke was
then to give Warden the remainder of the funds, minus his own fees.
According to the claim against him, however, Benecke never gave Warden the
bounty money she was supposed to get, but instead kept it. It was for this amount, plus
“lawful interest and cost of suit,” that the U.S. Attorney brought an indictment against
Benecke.148 While one hundred eight dollars does not sound like a large amount by
today’s standards, this was equivalent to between roughly four or five thousand dollars in
today’s money.149 This, however, was just the tip of the iceberg. There were other clients
of Benecke who were awarded even greater amounts.
A second client who claimed Benecke failed to pay the money owed to her and
kept it himself was a widow named Sophronia Farmer. Farmer grew up in Chariton
County on a farm about six miles north of Brunswick.150 She lived there ever since she
was four years old. While there, she married a man named Wilson Farmer who,
sometime after the Civil War began, joined the USCT to fight for the Union. Although
Farmer could not remember what regiment he fought with, Wilson died during his time
of service in the war and Sophronia became eligible for his pension.151
Like Emma Warden, and so many others, Farmer could not read or write. She
needed a lawyer to help with her claim and hired Benecke to handle the necessary
paperwork in order to file her claim. The amount due her for back pay and bounty totaled
three hundred sixty-nine dollars and thirty-five cents – over three times what was due
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Emma Warden.152 This is roughly equivalent to over sixteen thousand dollars in today’s
money. Although the amounts differed between their claims, Farmer, like Warden, failed
to receive all the money due her.
Initially, Farmer’s claim seemed to be moving along without any problems.
Benecke had Farmer put her mark on a number of documents she was told were for her
claim.153 She did not know what she was putting her mark to, only that she trusted
Benecke when he told her what to sign. Periodically, Farmer contacted Benecke to find
out if any word of her claim came through and each time Benecke told her that he had not
heard anything new.
One day, while visiting Benecke’s office in Brunswick, Farmer found Benecke
not there, but instead an associate of Benecke’s named John Cox was present. According
to Farmer, Cox was there to make a partial payment to Farmer: “I got 80 $ from Mr. Cox,
this is all I ever got.”154 The eighty dollars Cox gave to Farmer was merely the first of
more payments to follow – an installment plan, so to speak. Cox promised that more
money would follow and told her that Benecke wanted her to check in with him every
time she came to town.
Yet despite checking in with Benecke and Cox from time to time, no more money
ever came, although Farmer was always told it would. Farmer was, however, asked to
put her mark on more paperwork that, again, she could not read so she never knew what
documents she put her mark to, nor what they said. While she did receive the one-time
payment of eighty dollars, that still left a balance of two hundred eighty-nine dollars and
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thirty-five cents – an amount totaling almost thirteen thousand dollars in today’s
money.155 This balance was something Farmer never saw.
It was not long before Benecke and Farmer had no communication at all. Farmer
claimed that Cox eventually told her that there would be no more money for her “for a
while,” and that Benecke “had not spoken to me for over a year.”156 Since Benecke
refused to pay Farmer the balance of the money due – a charge Benecke denied because
he claimed that she received all money due - Farmer added her name to those who
brought suit against Benecke.
Between both Warden and Farmer, there was $398.33 in unpaid money that was
dispersed from the Bureau by Seely, to Benecke, and that Benecke failed to pass on to his
clients. Although Benecke, and his associate John Cox, continuously promised that more
money was on the way, neither Warden nor Farmer ever received it. Yet even this sum
was not a big loss when compared to the person who lost the most from dealing with
Benecke – a person whose loss, both economically and financially, was more than double
that of both Warden and Farmer.
It is never easy to lose a loved one in war. Whether it be a husband, a son, or a
brother, the tragedy of loss is devastating. Yet, what of those families during the Civil
War who lost multiple family members? Ann Parks was one of those unfortunate family
members. She lost three sons to the war – three times the grief. Dependent on her sons
to help her, Parks was eligible to receive a pension for her sons, as well as collect all back
pay and bounty money due each. It was for this reason that she sought out Benecke and
to hire him to take care of all the necessary paperwork for her claim.
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At the time she sought help from Benecke, Parks lived about ten miles outside of
Brunswick on the Bowling Green Prairie and had lived there seven years.157 There she
did some farming, as well as worked for a family at a nearby mill. Parks had four
children, a daughter and three sons, Thomas, John, and Robert. After the outbreak of the
Civil War, all three of Parks’ sons volunteered for the army, and all three men served as
privates in Company K, 65th Regiment, USCT. Unfortunately for Parks, all three of her
sons died while in service.
Several years after the end of the war, Parks traveled to Brunswick to hire
Benecke to help her with her claim. Benecke’s associate, John Cox, was also present, but
did not participate in the drawing up of papers, he just sat in a chair and watched.158 All
the forms were submitted to the government and on June 23, 1868, the Bureau approved
the claims for all three of Parks’s sons.159
The claim on her first son, Thomas, was awarded $300 in bounty money and a
back pay amount that totaled $69.72 for a total of $369.72. The Treasury Department did
not release the funds to Franklin Seely until October 23. Yet even though Seely received
the funds in October, it was not until February 16 of the following year that Seely sent the
money, $358.22, to Brunswick – and he did not send it to Parks, he sent it to Benecke.160
The claim for Parks’s second son, John, was even greater than his brothers. The
total amount for back pay and bounty due for John’s service, after expenses, was
$430.08. Even though the claim on John was approved on the same day as his brother
Thomas, Seely did not receive this money from the government until February 23 of the
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following year. Seely, as before, did not send the money to Parks, he sent it to Benecke
on March 13, 1869.161
The claim on Parks’s remaining son, Robert, was considerably lower than it was
for her other two sons. The total for his back pay and bounty, minus expenses, was
$163.12. This may be due to the time of death for Robert, but this is speculation – the
date of each son’s death is never mentioned in the indictment. This money was also
released to Seely on February 23, 1869, and he sent the money for this claim along with
the claim money for John on March 13.
By adding all claims together, Ann Parks was due a total of $952.15, which is
roughly around $42,000 in today’s money. This was a huge amount of money for any
person to get, let alone an older African American woman from Missouri in the wake of a
tragedy like the Civil War. Yet despite Seely receiving and sending the amount due to
her lawyer, Benecke did not give Parks the money she was owed.
According to Parks, after sending off the claims, Benecke was to let Parks know
when the claim was approved and when she could get her money. However, when Parks
went to Benecke’s office for an update, all Benecke ever told her was that he had not yet
heard anything about her claims. On one occasion, Benecke was not in his office, but his
associate, John Cox, was and told Parks that Benecke was in St. Louis.162 Since Benecke
was in periodic contact with Seely, it is doubtful that Seely would have neglected to
inform Benecke about the approval for the claims.
The main reason for this is that Seely would have sent a voucher to Benecke for
Parks to sign once the claims were approved. This was meant to verify that the person
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receiving the money from Seely was the right person. Even though Parks could not read,
it was Benecke’s job to inform her of what she needed to sign in order for Seely to send
her the money. Because of this, Benecke knew that the claims had been approved and
received the money from Seely without informing Parks. This means that when she was
told by Benecke that he never heard any developments regarding her claims, he was
being dishonest.
That is not to say that Parks never heard from Benecke or his associates about her
claims, nor that she did not receive any of the money. Sometime in the spring of 1869,
after Benecke received payment from Seely, Cox contacted Parks at her home and told
her that he wished to buy her claim.163 Parks, not wanting to give up all her claims, told
Cox that she would be willing to sell one to him, but not all three. According to Parks,
Cox offered her three hundred dollars for one of her claims.164 It is difficult to know
from this offered amount which claim Cox offered to buy, since this is not the amount
due any one of the individual claims.
When Cox showed up at the home of Parks, however, he brought with him a
package that was marked to contain two hundred forty dollars – much less than his
original offer. Upon counting the money Cox brought, it was discovered that there was
only two hundred thirty dollars. This might have been a simple mistake, or perhaps a
way of shorting Parks even further because Parks needed someone else present to count
the money for her – a nearby friend that Parks asked to come named Andrew Johnson.165
Without Johnson’s help counting the money, Parks may not have known she was shorted
the amount indicated.
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In addition to receiving the two hundred thirty dollars – an amount just under a
quarter of the total she was supposed to get – Benecke also had Parks put her mark to
papers that he told her she needed to sign. She put her mark on the papers as she was
asked, but at no point did she ever know what she signed nor what the papers said.166
Parks later claimed that she had never signed any voucher, nor any receipt of money.
However, since she could not read or write, and yet signed papers an instructed, she did
not know what she signed – whether it be a receipt, voucher, or something else. She also
never received the remaining $722.15 that she was due.
A close look at the above three clients reveals a similar chain of events: a mother
or widow hires Benecke to help them with their claims for back pay and bounty; Benecke
agrees, then draws up and sends the appropriate documents; the claim is approved and the
money owed is dispersed from the Treasury Department to Franklin A. Seely, the agent
in contact with Benecke; Seely sends the money owed to Benecke and instead of giving
the money to his clients, he keeps it – or, in the case of Ann Parks, keeps three quarters of
it; he then has the women sign documents, documents which are never explained to them
and for which they do not know the content because they cannot read or write; the
women never receive the money due them.
Between the three clients listed above, there is already over eleven hundred
dollars missing – money sent to Louis Benecke and never forwarded to the appropriate
party. Benecke claimed that all clients received all money due them and refused to pay
these women any more than he claimed he had. It was for this unlawful withholding of
money from veterans families that Benecke would be indicted and brought to trial.
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Emma Warden, Sophronia Farmer, and Ann Parks would not be alone. Four other
names would join the indictment of Louis Benecke. Although it took several years to
bring together, the ten count indictment brought a dark chapter to the otherwise illustrious
career that Benecke promotes in his book. A chapter that called into question the
integrity and character he had cultivated after the war. It is little wonder why he does not
mention it.
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THE FIRST TRIAL

All of the incidents involving the withholding of money, to the clients mentioned
above and the other four families, took place between the years of 1866 and 1870. Over
the next several years, Benecke’s former clients came forward to accuse him of taking
their money and sought legal help in gaining it back. That help would come from U.S.
Attorney James S. Botsford. Botsford brought together the case against Benecke over the
first half of the 1870’s. He compiled testimony from the victims, gathered his evidence,
and brought a ten count indictment against Benecke on September 11, 1875.167
The indictment was not only against Benecke, but also his colleague John Cox
who played a role in aiding Benecke in withholding the money from his clients. Both
men were charged with “retaining pay & bounty from claimants as attorneys &
agents.”168 This was the same charge for each count.
The ten count indictment was listed as follows: Counts 1-3 for each of Ann
Parks’ three sons, Thomas, John, and Robert in the amount of $721.92; count 4 for
Sophronia Farmer on behalf of her husband Wilson Farmer in the amount of $369; count
5 for Emma Warden on behalf of her husband Asbury Warden in the amount of $59;169
count 6 for Polk Lard, a veteran who survived the war, in the amount of $210; count 7 for
David Price on behalf of his son Dallas Price in the amount of $81; count 8 for David and
Letty Price on behalf of their son Dallas Price in the amount of $87; count 9 for Jackson
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Rowlett, a veteran who survived the war, in the amount of $47; and count 10 on behalf of
Silke Eikhoff on behalf of her brother Karsten Thede in the amount of $469.170 The total
amount allegedly withheld from Benecke’s clients totaled $2,042.92 – an amount that in
today’s money would be just over $90,000.
Benecke, for his part, spent the first half of the 1870’s beginning an even more
prominent chapter in his political career as a member of the Missouri State Senate.171 He
served as a State Senator until 1874. Although it is not clear, Benecke’s election to the
Senate may have contributed to Botsford not filing the indictment until 1875, the year
after Benecke left his Senate seat. Benecke was already a prominent, well-connected
politician when Botsford began compiling his case. To try and bring charges against a
sitting State Senator could have proven difficult, which may be why Botsford filed the
charges when he did. However, this is just speculation.
The trial took place at the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri in Jefferson City.172 Botsford brought the charges on behalf of the
plaintiffs, while the law firm of Lay & Belch & Waters & Winslow argued for the
defense of both Benecke and John Cox.173
The two strongest cases brought by Botsford centered on indictments six and ten.
These were the cases of Polk Lard and Silke Eikhoff. These two cases are referred to
here as the strongest cases because, of the ten indictments charged, Benecke was only
found guilty on these two counts. The accusations of Parks, Warden, Farmer, and the
other families were found not credible enough for Botsford to obtain a conviction on
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those counts. This means that out of all the money owed to the remaining families,
especially to Parks who had the most money taken, they received none of it.
Polk Lard resided in the town of Dalton, in Chariton County, and lived there for
ten years. After the war broke out, Lard joined Company B, 62d Regiment, USCT and
served with this unit through the duration of war.174 After the conclusion of the war, Lard
knew he was entitled to receive all the back pay due him, as well as all bounty money
promised. It was for this reason that Lard traveled to Brunswick and hired Benecke to
help him with his claim.
As with the other clients who hired Benecke, Lard checked in with him at his
office from time to time to find out if his claim had been approved. According to Lard, in
1869 he went in to see Benecke in order to ask him about whether or not he would be
willing to buy his claim.175 At that time, Lard was in financial difficulty and was looking
to get his money as quickly as possible. Benecke, however, informed him that he was not
legally able to buy his claim and put Lard in touch with an associate of his named
Bosse.176 Bosse informed Lard that he would be willing to buy his claim for $65 and
asked Lard if he knew of anyone else who would be willing to sell their claim. Lard told
him that he knew of a couple of others who might be willing to sell and agreed to meet
Bosse at a later time to sell his claim.
Three weeks later, Lard meet with Bosse and told him he was still willing to sell
his claim, but he did not find anyone else who wanted to sell. Much to the surprise of
Lard, Bosse told him that the likelihood of him getting his claim was “doubtful” and at
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that time only offered $55 for the claim instead of $65.177 Lard looked to Benecke for
advice about whether or not to sell and asked Benecke how much he though the claim
was worth. Benecke advised him that he felt the claim was worth between $75 and $80
dollars and that Lard should not sell unless “he did need money,” and that “$55 would
probably do him more good that $75 or $80.”178
Lard decided to sell to Bosse and accepted the $55 he offered. Further, Lard was
then directed by Benecke and Bosse to sign a piece of paper when giving Bosse the
money. Lard testified that, even though he could read a little, he did not have any idea of
what the paper said.179 It was revealed at the trial that the paper Benecke had Lard sign
was an acknowledgment letter from Franklin A. Seely, the disbursement agent in St.
Louis who was in contact with Benecke. The letter was as follows:
Col. F.A. Seely, U.S.A.D.O. Mo., St. Louis, Mo.
Col.—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of check, No. 241, on
Mchts. Nat. B’k., St. Louis, for $289.50 for my services in the U.S.
service, and with many thanks for your promptness in helping a sick
colored man. I remain.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
Polk Lard180
After having Lard sign this letter, Benecke sent it to Seely as proof that Lard
received the money due him. What this letter revealed was that Benecke knew about the
approval of Lard’s claim the entire time he was directing him to Bosse. He had Bosse tell
Lard that his claim was doubtful and offered him a low amount knowing that his claim
had been approved and the money was coming. This also means that when Benecke told
Lard that he could get between $75 and $80 for his claim, he was lying. He allowed his
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client to accept $55 when he knew it was worth $290. This was a strong piece of
evidence that Benecke’s lawyers could not argue away.
Seely testified that he disbursed the money due Lard to Benecke along with the
acknowledgment letter.181 Seely always contacted Benecke directly instead of trying to
deal with clients like Lard because he knew that most of them could not read or write.
He would send notification of the approval of a claim along with a voucher – the
acknowledgement letter. Seely further testified that he would not send the money until
“vouchers were returned duly executed with instructions how to send the money.”182 In
order for Benecke to have Lard sign the paper, he must have received notification from
Seely about the approval of the claim and how much it was worth. Seely’s testimony
further solidified the case against Benecke and led to his conviction on this count.
The tenth count, for which Benecke was also found guilty, centered on claimant
Sarah “Silke” Eikhoff. Eikhoff was the sister of Karsten Thede, a Union soldier who
died fighting for the Union during the war. At the time of the war’s conclusion, Eikhoff
lived near Brunswick, but moved shortly after the war to Forks of the Chariton, a place
roughly 20 miles from Brunswick.183 She very quickly decided to file a claim on her
brother for his back pay and bounty money.
Eikhoff’s claim was unique from the others for two reasons: 1) Karsten Thede
was a white soldier; 2) Eikhoff filed two separate claims on her brother’s back pay – both
of which involved Benecke. The first claim filed did not involve Eikhoff in direct contact
with Benecke. Instead, power of attorney was given to General John B. Gray “and was
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executed before Louis Benecke as notary public.”184 Like Benecke, after the war Grey
helped veterans file their claims against the government to receive money due them. He
knew Benecke and even sent cases to him on occasion. Grey acted as the intermediary
between the government and Benecke on behalf of Eikhoff.
According to Grey’s testimony, he received notice of the approval of Eikhoff’s
claim in 1866 for the amount of $469. After deducting his fees, Grey sent the balance of
the claim to Benecke in the amount of $420, but never informed Eikhoff that her claim
had been approved, nor did he inform her that he received the money.185 He merely
informed Benecke of the approval and sent the money directly to him. There was even a
certificate of deposit for $420 through National Loan Bank paid to the order of Louis
Benecke and endorsed by him.186
Just like with his other clients, Benecke did not give Eikhoff the money that she
was owed, although he did claim to have paid her.187 Eikhoff testified that she went to see
Benecke “two or three times” trying to ascertain what was going on with her claim, but
Benecke “put her off,” telling her that he did not have time to talk to her.188 Just as with
Lard, Benecke had received confirmation about Eikhoff’s claim being approved, yet did
not tell his client about it. He learned about it from Grey and Grey sent him the money
that he was to give to her, yet he refused to do so.
In 1871, Eikhoff remarried to a man named Charles Strota, whom she told about
her claim. Strota, on her behalf, went to see Benecke about the missing money and
Benecke assured him that he would write a letter to the bureau to check on what
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happened to the money – knowing full well that the claim was paid and he collected the
money. Just as he had done with Eikhoff, Benecke told Strota that the government
informed him that there was no money because the claim had been paid. Strota testified
that he told Benecke that a mistake had been made and his wife was still due money form
the government on account of her brother.189
In 1873, when no progress had been made regarding her first claim, Eikhoff and
her husband once again went to see Benecke about filing out a second claim for the
money. It had been seven years since her first claim was filed and a certified check from
John Grey was sent to Benecke to pay her for the claim. Eikhoff, however, knew nothing
of this – Grey never informed her that her claim was approved, and Benecke never gave
her the money sent to him to give to her. Yet, even in 1873, Benecke acted as if he knew
nothing of what happened to the first claim and, according to Strota, told both Eikhoff
and himself that “he would fix the claim so they would get it.”190 Unfortunately for
Benecke, there was a paper trail that led directly to him in the form of deposit receipts
from Grey.
While Botsford made a compelling case for the guilt of Benecke regarding Lard
and Eikhoff, Benecke’s defensive team mounted a strong, although in some instances
strange, repudiation of the charges. The first argument they leveled was that the charges
brought by Botsford did not show that Benecke or Cox “have been guilty of any crime
punishable under the laws of the United States.”191 While Botsford provided some
evidence and the testimony of the victims, nothing revealed that Benecke was guilty of
any crimes.
189

Benecke Papers, File #2426.
Benecke Papers, File #2426.
191
United States vs. Louis Benecke & John Cox, “Transcript from district court,” 15.
190

80

The second argument made by the defense was much more striking. They argued
that the plaintiffs had not had “any valid or lawful claim against the United States, nor is
it alleged for what services the alleged pay and bounty was due, nor that the same was
due for any service, in the Army or otherwise, authorized by law.”192 They are saying, in
effect, that the claims made by Benecke’s clients were not credible because there was
nothing to indicate that the soldiers on whom the claims were made were ever in the army
to deserve pay and bounties.
This is a remarkable claim to make, due to the fact that government records from
the Treasury Department indicated that funds were disbursed to Franklin Seely, the agent
in St. Louis, and Seely then passed the money on to Benecke. In the case of Eikhoff, the
money was disbursed to John Grey and then to Benecke. The very fact that Benecke
received the money he did from Seely is testament to the validity of the claims made.
The Treasury Department would not have disbursed the money if the claims were not
valid. This was a weak argument on the part of Benecke’s defense.
The defense based their strongest arguments on two key points: that there was no
provision in the pension acts that prohibited withholding money from clients and that the
statute of limitation for the claims had expired. The defense would give much more
attention to the first point than the second because they felt that if the first point was
proved in their favor, the second would follow easily.
The argument for the first point was based on the amended version to the General
Pension Act that was enacted in July of 1864. In section 13 of the act it states “any agent
or attorney…who shall wrongfully withhold from a pensioner or other claimant the whole
or any part of the pension of claim…shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor” and
192
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be subject to either a fine or prison.193 Benecke’s lawyers argued that this section was not
talking about back pay and bounty money. In fact, they argued that the updated versions
of the Pension Act that likewise appeared in 1870 and 1873 also did not refer to back pay
and bounty. The focus of these acts were on pensions and claims, and they were meant to
set financial limits on the lawyers working on the behalf of their clients – back pay and
bounties were not included in the intent of the act.
The defense pointed to the language from the most recent update to the Pension
Act, which took place in 1873. Like the earlier acts, section 31 of the 1873 act stated that
should anyone “wrongfully withhold from a pensioner or claimant the whole or any part
of the pension or claim” then that person is guilty of a misdemeanor.194 While all the
previous acts lay out the restrictions on what a lawyer can be paid, according to the
defense there was no specific language that stated it was against the law to withhold
money for back pay and bounties.
The second of the main arguments for the defense regarded the statute of
limitations. Benecke’s lawyers pointed out that even if the charges against Benecke were
true, the statute of limitations for the charges against Benecke was only five years – and
the clock for this “would commence to run from the time said claimants acquired said
knowledge,” meaning knowledge that they had been denied their money.195 Since the
initial claims against Benecke happened more than five years before Botsford filed the
indictments in September of 1875, the five year statute of limitations had expired and no
charges could be brought against Benecke on these issues.
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While a good deal was revealed during the trial about the legal practices of
Benecke and his associates, one counter argument by his defense revealed something
interesting about the charges brought forth by Botsford. Jackson Rowlett, the individual
who made up the ninth count in the indictment and who was brought to the trial by
Botsford to be a witness for the plaintiffs, testified that he had not wanted to be a part of
the indictment. Rowlett signed a statement in which he stated that he “never authorized
anyone to make any complaint against said L. Benecke for said charge nor made any
charge against said L. Benecke at any time.”196 Rowlett further claimed that the first time
he ever spoke to Botsford about the case was when Botsford called him into his office on
the night before the trial.197 If this is true, then it is curious why Botsford would call him
in as a witness and not surprising that Benecke was found not guilty on count nine.
Another one of the objections raised by the defense was that “the court refused to
allow proper and competent evidence on the part of the defendant.”198 One of the things
referred to by this objection is the dismissal of a witness for the plaintiffs who had
evidence that supported Benecke’s case. This evidence came from an express agent
named Granville D. Kennedy. Kennedy had access to receipts books that showed in the
case of counts seven and eight, the counts involving David and Letty Price, that the
money sent from St. Louis to Brunswick did not go to Louis Benecke as Botsford
claimed.199 Botsford subpoenaed Kennedy and his receipt books, but when they revealed
evidence that went against the charges, Botsford dismissed Kennedy “without having
been called upon to testify as to said Express receipt book or any other transaction
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concerning it.”200 Although he was trying to present as strong a case as he could against
Benecke, Botsford did not do his case any good by these kinds of tactics, especially since
this helped lead to eight of the ten indictments being found to have no merit.
When the trial was over, Louis Benecke was found guilty on counts six and ten
for illegally withholding back pay and bounties from his clients. Only Polk Lard and
Silke Eikhoff seemed to find some measure of justice. Yet, the trial raised as many
questions as it answered – legal questions that allowed Benecke’s lawyers to appeal the
decision all the way to the highest court in the land. Benecke’s trials were not yet over
and the ultimate outcome would be decided by an ever-increasingly anti-equal protection
Supreme Court.
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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 1870’S

Even though Benecke was convicted on two counts of withholding money, he still
had one more chance to clear his name – the Supreme Court. However, the court was, by
the time of the trial in 1878, a court emerging from the failure of Reconstruction – a
failure they helped bring about. Benecke did not go before a court that was interested in
preserving the legal rights of African-Americans, but a court that helped weaken those
rights in favor of a strict interpretation and reading of the law that enabled a resurgence of
racist attitudes towards the policies of Reconstruction.
During the first decade after the Civil War between 1866 and 1876, a time which
corresponds to when Benecke’s offenses and trial took place, Reconstruction became the
focus of the American government. Many questions arose about what the role of former
slaves would be in America moving forward, as well as what kind of rights these former
slaves would have. In response, new laws and amendments, enacted at both the state and
federal levels, “established as a matter of federal law the principle of equal rights for all
citizens regardless of race.”201 Just as pension care expanded in the wake of the war, the
Republicans in Congress tried to use the legal system to expand the notion of equality for
black people in America.
In order to accomplish this, Congress passed the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments
to the Constitution, better known today as the Reconstruction amendments. These
amendments ended slavery, granted due process and equal protection under the law to
African Americans, as well as gave them the right to vote. This was a radical change for
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Americans north and south, most of whom were not comfortable with “the
establishment…of civil and political equality” with black people.202 Many did not feel
that black people should have the right to vote believing that they were not capable of
making competent decisions. Nor did they feel that black people were equal to whites –
racist attitudes did not vanish after the Civil War.
As Reconstruction entered the 1870’s, public sentiment began to change and turn
against the efforts of Reconstruction. Not just Democrats, but even Republicans began
accepting the notion that Reconstruction was a mistake – that “the efforts of the federal
government to uplift and protect former slaves came to be seen by many white Americans
as a form of favoritism, which in effect discriminated against the white population.”203
This argument of reverse-racism began to permeate sentiment in Congress, even to the
point that many Republicans reversed themselves on the importance of helping former
slaves. Instead, they began to believe that the best course of action was “to re-establish
national harmony by sacrificing the Negro.”204 And sacrifice them they did with the help
of the Court.
The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the 1870’s would help feed these
notions of racial inequality by undermining the amendments that were meant to help
black people, as well as the ability of Congress to enforce them.205 This was further done
to gain some credibility back with the American people. Ever since the disastrous
decision in Dred Scott, the Court needed to improve its reputation with the public, which
reveals that the Court not only helped shape public opinion, but was also influenced by
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it.206 Three cases stand out during this period as key rulings for the Court, rulings that
specifically undermined the 14th and 15th amendments, rulings that were the most
instrumental in eroding the essence of what the amendments were created for – the
upliftment and protection of black Americans.
The first of the three cases are commonly known as the Slaughterhouse Cases,
and were decided by the Court in 1873. Even though this case was not brought about due
to any violation of the rights of African Americans, it was the first “severe contraction of
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command” to protect a citizen against a state’s
attempt to deny privileges or due process.207
The case originated in New Orleans when the State of Louisiana granted one
slaughtering company exclusive rights to operate in the city “for the landing, keeping,
and slaughter of livestock.”208 Feeling unjustly left out, the excluded butchers, known as
the Butchers’ Benevolent Association, tried to block what they perceived to be a forced
monopoly and argued that they were unfairly prevented from operating their businesses.
They based this argument on the grounds that their 14th amendment rights to due process
had been violated. When the state courts upheld the law, the BBA appealed to the
Supreme Court.209
By a five-to-four vote, the Court voted to uphold the law that allowed the state
sanctioned slaughterhouse. In the majority opinion, the Court ruled that the 14th
amendment was specifically created to help newly freed black people, not everyone else.

206

Foner, “The Supreme Court,” 1590.
Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, 59.
208
Gary Hartman, Roy M. Mersky, and Cindy L. Tate, Landmark Supreme Court Cases: The Most
Influential Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Checkmark Books – An
Imprint of Infobase Publishing, 2007), 19.
209
Hartman, et al., Landmark Supreme Court Cases, 19.
207

87

The Court further stated that state citizenship and federal citizenship are two different
things, and that since “most civil rights are attributes of state citizenship, [they are]
therefore beyond the reach of the amendment.”210 In other words, the 14th amendment
protected federal citizenship, but it was not meant to keep a state from being able to
regulate the people in it.
The impact of this decision was to limit the scope of the 14th amendment in a way
that would open the door for southern state legislatures to pass acts that could infringe on
the rights of black people. This was significant because the Slaughterhouse cases were
the first instance in which the Court was called on to interpret the new Reconstruction
laws. By ruling the way they did, the 14th amendment was severely weakened, which
made it “ineffective in protecting individual rights against invasion by state
governments.”211 This became a significant factor in the following years.
The second critical case during this period came in 1876 with the Court’s decision
in United States v. Reese. This case came about when an electoral officer in the state of
Kentucky refused to allow a black man to register to vote. This official was indicted for
violating the 15th amendment and the Enforcement Act of 1870. Both of these prohibit
anyone from excluding or infringing on the right of a person to vote because of their race
or color. However, just as the court had weakened the 14th amendment earlier, they
would now do the same to the 15th amendment.
In their majority opinion, the Court ruled that “the Fifteenth Amendment extends
no positive guarantees of the franchise, and does not ‘confer the right of suffrage upon
anyone,’ but merely prohibits both the federal and state governments from excluding
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persons from voting by reason of ‘race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”212 In
other words, African Americans don’t really have a right to vote, it’s just that the state
and federal government can’t stop them if they want to. This greatly weakened the 15th
amendment and made it easier for southern states to find new ways to construct obstacles
to put in the way of black voters. It did not take long before poll taxes, literacy tests, and
grandfather clauses began to emerge throughout the south.213
The third case to make a dramatic impact on the Reconstruction amendments was
also decided in 1876 – the case of United States v. Cruikshank. This ruling came about
as a result of the Colfax massacre that took place on Easter Sunday, April 13, 1873.
Dozens of armed white men descended on the courthouse in Colfax, which was being
defended by a large group of African Americans. Fighting broke out, and when the
shooting was complete, over 100 African Americans had been shot, many of whom were
shot after surrendering to the white mob. Of the dozens of white men arrested for the
murder of such a large number African-Americans, only three were convicted. Their
case went all the way to the Supreme Court – a case that should have been an easy verdict
to make.
Despite being convicted of numerous murders, the Court ruled that the men in
question did nothing wrong because the 14th amendment only applied if the State was
trying to keep black people from voting, not private citizens: “The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against
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another.”214 Despite the State having a responsibility to protect and defend its people
from those who violate the law, this ruling gave sanction to the actions of private citizens,
including organized groups of citizens such as the Klan and other white supremacy
groups, to do whatever they felt necessary to prevent African Americans from exercising
their right to vote. Protecting the right to vote for black people was one of the main
reasons the equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment were created, but the Court
completely ignored this in their ruling – a decision that had disastrous consequences for
African-Americans in the South.
Historian Eric Foner has noted that “for most of its history, when faced with the
task of interpreting Reconstruction measures, the Supreme Court has generally chosen a
narrow reading.”215 Due to these “narrow” readings, the Court undermined the very laws
that were meant to help black Americans join society in a way that enabled them to enjoy
the same basic rights as other men. They helped bring about the failure of Reconstruction
and made the lives of all black people, north and south, vulnerable to attack.
This was the Court Louis Benecke came before in 1878 – a Court that no longer
cared about the plight of African Americans and whose “narrow” legal interpretations
would once again aid in a group of African Americans being deprived of what was due
them.
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

As soon as the verdict came down against Benecke on counts six and ten in the
spring of 1876, the appeals process began. One of the main arguments made by
Benecke’s attorneys was that there was not enough evidence presented to warrant a
conviction on those two counts. However, this was but one question that arose from his
trial before the District Court. Six legal questions emerged from the trial and were sent
up the ladder to the Supreme Court for them to decide. It would take two years for the
trial before the Supreme Court to occur, and it was scheduled for the October term in
1878.216
The six questions raised by the District Court were as follows: 1) “Is wrongfully
withholding back-pay or bounty by an agent or attorney from a claimant an offense under
section 13 of the act of July 4, 1864, or under act of March 3, 1873?”; 2) “Are sections 12
and 13 of the act of July 4, 1864, repealed by the act of July 8, 1870?”; 3) “Are the
crimes set out in the indictment continuous down to the finding of the indictment?”; 4)
“Does the statute of limitations constitute a bar to this prosecution?”; 5) “Can the
defendant be punished under the act of March 3, 1873?”; 6) Are the sixth and tenth
counts sufficiently certain to authorize a judgment thereon?”217 Since the District Court
did not feel it had the ability to rule on these questions, they referred them to the Supreme
Court to determine.
While these questions appear to raise legitimate questions regarding the lower
court’s decision, one can notice in the phrasing of the first question that the emphasis is
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on a strict reading of the acts. It isn’t asking whether or not withholding money from a
client is wrong, it is only asking if it is wrong according to the acts. By the very nature of
this question, it is raising the possibility that lawyers withholding money from their
clients is perfectly legal because there is no specific language in the previous pension acts
that precludes it. In other words, even though back pay and bounties are mentioned in the
acts above, if there is no specific language against keeping money that belongs to one’s
clients, then keeping it is legal. To get this kind of ruling, one would need a Supreme
Court that showed a tendency to read the exact letter of the law without any consideration
of further intent or meaning. Fortunately for Benecke, that was the Court he was facing.
The man in charge of making the case against Benecke was Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Edwin B. Smith. Smith addressed the questions above by letting the acts in
question speak for themselves. Regarding question one, Smith pointed to the clear
language in section 13 of the 1864 act:
That any agent or attorney…who shall contract or agree to prosecute any
claim for a pension, bounty, or other allowance, under this act, on the
condition that he shall receive a per centum upon any portion of the
amount, or who shall wrongfully withhold from a pensioner OR OTHER
CLAIMANT the whole of any part of the pension or claim allowed and
due to such pensioner or claimant, shall be deemed guilty of a high
misdemeanor.218
Smith then followed by showing the clear language from the act of 1873:
any agent or attorney, or any other person instrumental in prosecuting a
claim for pension or bounty land, …who shall wrongfully withhold from a
pensioner or claimant the whole or any part of the pension or claim
allowed and due such pensioner or claimant, …shall be deemed guilty of a
high misdemeanor.219
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Notice the emphasis on the words “claim” and “claimants” that Smith added here. These,
argued Smith, indicate that there were more things to make a claim for than just a
pension. For Smith, the language spoke for itself – if a lawyer or agent withholds money
due for a claim, that lawyer or agent is guilty of a “high misdemeanor.” This, according
to Smith, covered the offense committed by Benecke.
Regarding question two, Smith argued that the language in the act of 1870 covers
how “pensions are made payable directly to the pensioner” and that a different formula
for what fees and agent can receive was made.220 It did not, however, refer to any prior
statutes, “nor does it relate at all to the subject of bounty; therefore, the implication of a
repeal as to this is repelled.”221 In other words, since the act of 1864 laid out the penalties
for withholding money due a claimant, and since there was no language in the act of 1870
that altered the ’64 act, then the ’70 act could not be interpreted as repealing something
stipulated earlier.
Smith linked questions three and four together. Regarding whether withholding
money is a continuous crime, Smith argued with an analogy – if person A received
money that belongs to person B a year ago, still has it today and refuses to pay it to
person B, then person A is withholding person B’s money today as much as person A has
been withholding it for the past year. According to Smith, the very fact of someone
withholding money over an extended period of time constitutes “a continued denial of
that which is demanded as a lawful right.”222 Therefore, withholding money is a
continuous crime.
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Smith then links this with question 4 by suggesting that “if the first knowledge of
the receipt of the money, and its demand and refusal, were within the statutory time, the
prosecution ought not to be considered barred.”223 Smith may be referring here to the
moment the plaintiffs came forward to pursue a legal remedy to their problem. For some,
like Ann Parks, the realization that they did not receive the money due them came in
1869 – and for Eikhoff it was even earlier. This would put them past the statute of
limitations, which was five years. Smith is perhaps referring to the moment the clients
realized they had been cheated and came forward when he suggests the statute of
limitations still applied.
Smith based the continuous nature of the crime as his position on the remaining
two questions. If the Court ruled in the affirmative on question 3, then the others would
follow the same.224 This was a big assumption on the part of Smith; he assumed once an
affirmative was given to question three, the questions that followed would be affirmed as
well. However, he felt the language of the acts was clear and that Benecke’s actions were
in clear violation of those acts.
It is hard to tell just how vigorously Smith argued on behalf of the government
and the plaintiffs. The arguments in the U.S. Brief to the Court rely on a plain
interpretation of the acts and an understanding that back pay and bounties are included.
Yet his arguments are short and do not elaborate much at all. One has to ask whether he
felt confident in the obviousness of the case or merely gave a token effort in trying to
convince the Court of his arguments.
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By contrast, the Brief from Benecke’s lawyers was massive. His legal team took
great pains to completely break down and dissect the language of each of the
aforementioned pension acts in order to show that they had nothing to do with back pay
and bounties. In fact, Benecke’s team spent 14 pages on the first question alone, whereas
Smith spent only one. The core of the defense was centered on this first question. If they
could demonstrate that the various pension acts did not mean to include back pay and
bounties, then the government’s case would fall apart.
The defense pointed to the terms “claimant” and “other claimant” that appeared in
the various forms of the pension acts. They contended that when the acts talked about
how it was wrong to withhold money from “a pensioner” or “other claimant,” the acts
referred to someone else and did not refer to people seeking their back pay and bounties –
these people were not intended to be included under the law.225 The defense called on a
strict reading of the acts without any further consideration as to whether or not people
seeking pay and bounties were protected by the pension laws.
Due to the lack of specific language in the acts that forbids lawyers and agents
from keeping money from their clients, Benecke could not be charged with a crime. As
his defense team argued, it is a “well defined rule, which is, that crimes cannot be made
out by implication merely, but must be clearly defined in the statute upon which they are
predicated.”226 They further argued that back pay and bounties were not even a part of the
pension system: “The act of July, 1864, was but supplemental to the act to grant
pensions, and embraced no other subject of legislation…Arrears of pay and bounty are
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not even mentioned.”227 If there is no legislation specifically speaking about pay and
bounties, and it is wrong to withhold them, then how could one commit a crime for doing
it?
This was the heart if Benecke’s defense – the government could not charge
Benecke with a crime because nothing he did violated any provision in the various
pension acts. In fact, Benecke’s lawyers went further and accused the government of
trying to manufacture a reason to convict Benecke – to “import an offense into [the
pension acts] by construction, which has no legitimate place there.”228
As to the remaining questions, Benecke’s lawyers spend hardly any time
addressing them. If the premise be held in the affirmative that he committed no crime,
then the remaining questions were mute. They summed up their argument this way:
“From this review of the subject, it seems clear that there is nothing in the language of the
legislation itself, the context and subject matter, or the course of contemporaneous
legislation, form which the intention of the legislature to denounce withholding arrears of
pay and bounty can be deduced.”229
Having heard both sides of the argument, the case now rested in the hands of the
nine justices of the Court. The Court was led by Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, a
Republican from Ohio who was appointed to the top seat in March of 1874, after the
death of Salmon P. Chase.230 The Waite Court was comprised of justices Ward Hunt, a
Republican from New York who was appointed to the Court in 1873, William Strong, a
Republican from Pennsylvania appointed in 1870, Samuel F. Miller, a Republican from
227

U.S. vs. Benecke, “Statement and Brief for Defendant,” 17.
U.S. vs. Benecke, “Statement and Brief for Defendant,” 21.
229
U.S. vs. Benecke, “Statement and Brief for Defendant,” 20.
230
“Justices of the United States Supreme Court,” The Green Papers, last modified October 2, 2016,
accessed October 15, 2016, www.thegreenpapers.com/Hx/JusticesUSSC.html.
228

96

Iowa appointed in 1862, Joseph P. Bradley, a Republican from New Jersey appointed in
1870, Noah H. Swayne, a Republican from Ohio appointed in 1862, David Davis, an
independent form Illinois appointed in 1862, Stephen J. Field, a Democrat from
California appointed in 1863, and finally Nathan Clifford, a Democrat from Maine and
longest tenured member of the Court who was appointed in 1858 – six Republicans, two
Democrats, and one Independent.231
With all those Republicans on the Court, some of whom were appointed by
Abraham Lincoln, one might assume that a man like Benecke, found guilty of not giving
black veterans and their families the money they were due, might have cause for concern.
After all, the Republicans were the party of emancipation and were known for helping
former slaves find equality in America. Yet one must remember that this was the very
court that had helped erode the protections within the Reconstruction amendments, which
enabled more injustice and inequality to emerge in the south – and the Court would not
change this trend in the Benecke case.
The decision rendered by the Court would be short and direct – in fact, it could
almost be taken right out of the defense brief. Justice Miller, writing the opinion of
Court, summed up the case in one of the shorter Court opinions one will read. For
comparison, the opinion of Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case was well over fifty
pages – Justice Miller would write just three.
Justice Miller’s opinion focuses entirely on the first question and on how the term
“claimant” should be defined.232 According to Miller, the pension acts do not mention
anything about back pay and bounties. Regarding the term, “claimant,” the Court
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decided that a limited definition would be appropriate. Even though when one petitions
the government for ones back pay and bounty and files a claim, this is not the kind of
claim that the pension acts cover. The Court could have ruled otherwise, since they also
recognized that the word “bounty” does appear in the language of the acts, however the
Court ruled “that this would be an unjustifiable extension of a penal statute beyond its
terms and against its purpose.”233
In other words, the Court ruled that since the acts speak directly of “pensions” and
“claims,” the claims referred to are strictly meant to be interpreted as pension claims, not
claims for pay and bounties. Even though Smith argued that seeking one’s pay and
bounty was done through a “claim,” the limited reading of the acts by the Court rejected
Smith’s argument. Therefore, since Benecke could not be charged with violating a law
that did not exist, he could not be guilty of a crime: “The first question is therefore to be
answered in the negative and we need not inquire if the statute was repealed, since the
offense described in the indictment is not within it.”234
What remained of the decision covered the issue of the statute of limitations.
Since Benecke decided to withhold the money of his clients when he did in the late
1860’s, “the law then in existence did not make the act charged a crime.”235 Since there
was no specific law that prohibited a lawyer like Benecke from keeping money that
belonged to his clients at that time, he could not be said to have done anything wrong.
The Court based this decision on an assumption about the intent of Congress
regarding the law: “the party might very well be criminally wrong in failing to pay when
he received it, but Congress could hardly be supposed to intend to punish as a crime his
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failure to pay afterwards what was in law but a debt created five years before.”236 This is
quite an assumption to make about the intent of Congress, especially since the men who
passed the laws still lived and could be asked what their intentions were. It is almost as if
the Court is saying ‘Yes, he might well be guilty and should be charged with a crime, but
who are we to say that is what Congress wanted?” – They were the Supreme Court, the
very branch that could decide to interpret the law in a way as to prevent this crime, but
they chose not to do so.
The decision went right along with the main arguments from the defense, namely
that if question one was answered in the negative then the other questions were not valid
and that the statute of limitations had passed. Benecke could not have gotten a more
favorable verdict and all the money he refused to pay to the clients he represented, thanks
to the Court, he got to keep.
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CONCLUSION

The magnitude of the Civil War not only changed the nature of American society,
but changed the way the government treated and cared for veterans through enhancement
and expansion of the pension system. What started as a way for taking care of soldiers
directly wounded in combat became a system that cared for not only the veterans, but
also their widows, children, and even parents. The evolution of the pension system was a
recognition on the part of Congress, and all Americans, that the country owed a debt to
the brave men who fought to preserve it – and the country would repay that debt by
standing by those men in their time of need, just as they had stood by their country.
Yet the racism and prejudice towards African Americans that existed prior to
1861 did not evaporate in the wake of the Civil War. It remained and has tainted the
nation up until the present day. That taint was reflected in the Pension Bureau in the
years following the Civil War due to the racism and prejudice of men within the system
who were supposed to monitor its operation. The unwillingness of some men to see past
the color of the very veterans and families they were meant to help had lasting effects.
This was true not just for the veterans themselves, but also on future generations.
Denying a veteran or their families the money due them meant denying them a chance at
a better life; it meant denying them the opportunity to move forward and leave something
behind for their children; it meant denying them the basic dignity and respect they earned
by standing up to defend their homes and their nation.
This is not to say that white veterans did not have difficulties either, nor that no
white veterans were denied pensions themselves, they certainly had their struggles too, as
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did many Americans recovering from four years of war. However, the added obstacles
that black veterans had to overcome were far greater and made even worse due to the
bigotry of the day – bigotry that resulted in many black veterans and their families being
rejected by their country and left with nothing.
Ann Parks was one of those people, as was Sophronia Farmer and Emma Warden.
Parks lost more than most as a result of the war. She not only lost all three of her sons in
the fighting, but, due to the ruling of the Supreme Court, she was denied the back pay and
bounty money that she was eligible for as well. None of the clients who were a part of
the indictment against Louis Benecke ever received the money due them. The little they
did receive was only a small portion of what was owed. The system that was supposed to
help them, failed them.
On the other hand, Louis Benecke emerged from his trials unscathed. After his
victory before the court in 1878, he returned home to Brunswick and resumed a life of
prominence and public service. He was re-elected mayor of Brunswick the following
year and would hold that position until 1887, when he was elected a city councilman.237
Benecke also served as a member of the school board in Brunswick and was elected
Director of Public Schools in 1890, a position he would hold off and on again until his
resignation from that post in 1908.238 He would also serve as a director for many
prominent businesses such as First National Bank, Brunswick B & T Co., and Elliot
Grove Cemetery. He was even elected President of the Board of Trustees for the State
Soldiers’ Home in 1897, a position he would hold until 1901.239
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The trials of Louis Benecke reveal one example of how a system that was created
to be equal for all ultimately cannot be equal if those operating within the system refuse
to treat all people fairly. When this is the case, an unbalanced system driven by prejudice
emerges. Congress can pass laws and regulations, but if the institutions designated to
enforce and oversee those laws and regulations contain people who will deny equal
treatment to others based on race, skin color, gender, or sexual orientation, then the
system will be inherently flawed and ultimately fail those it is supposed to help. This is a
problem still faced by Americans today, just as it was during Reconstruction.
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